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I. INTRODUCTION  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to look at European contemporary 
development in transforming military forces from conscripts to professionals. In 
particular, it investigates the implications for the Czech armed forces as they 
professionalize. There are a number of ongoing transformation processes in post-Cold 
War Europe, such as the economic transformation of Eastern European countries, reform 
of European Union institutions and the creation of a common currency. While relatively 
obscure in the public policy agenda, military professionalization has lately attracted 
increased interest with new sources of information now available. In 1993, there was a 
brief message that Belgium was abandoning conscription and creating professional 
forces. In 1996, the Netherlands announced it was switching to fully professional armed 
forces. In the same year, European powers, such as France and Spain, announced their 
intention to have professional forces in 2002. Next, Portugal and Italy also decided to 
transform their armed forces. In 2001, the Czech Republic announced its intention to 
transform to an all-volunteer force.  
Until the end of the Cold War, most European countries used conscription 
systems. Only Great Britain had a volunteer force. Both the U.S. and UK have a long 
history of an all-volunteer force. So, what caused countries with a tradition of 
conscription to now change?  What has changed for the Czech Republic to initiate the 
reform? Conscription and its features, how it evolved and what has changed will be 
examined. Next, the all-volunteer or professional force, its structures and rational will be 
explored. Then, both systems, noting their advantages and disadvantages, will be 
compared. A further step will be the exploration of European defense trends, 
requirements and tasks. In light of these changes, the goals of the Czech armed forces and 
how they would like to achieve them are discussed. Next, the experiences of the UK, the 
U.S., France, Belgium, Spain and Italy are examined in order to learn from these 
experiences.    
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Finally the Czech Republic and its political, economic, social and military 
conditions will be investigated. Our analysis of post experience will then be applied to 
better understand the process of transformation in the Czech armed forces. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In this study, the reasons why European countries are moving to all-volunteer or 
professional forces will be explained. The main research was based on experience, the 
process and the form of transformation followed in the United States and Great Britain. 
Also, information from countries using professional forces in Europe was researched. 
This information was gathered to analyze the decision of the Czech armed forces to 
develop an all-volunteer force. This information is then used to analyze the problems 
associated with transformation and how to avoid them, as well as generally address the 
management of these professional forces.   
B. OBJECTIVES 
The transformation of forces is examined in terms of needed management 
changes. What is needed for an all-volunteer force to work properly? Problems 
encountered by other countries in the transformation of forces are considered and reasons 
analyzed. Solutions are addressed. The main purpose is to help the Czech armed forces 
avoid possible pitfalls.  
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Primary question: 
• What lessons learned by the professional military forces of the United 
States, Great Britain and other countries are applicable to today's Czech 
armed forces? 
Secondary questions: 
• What new challenges do the Czech military face? 
• What is the useful body of knowledge about volunteer forces, and how is 
it applicable to the Czech Armed Forces? 
• How should the experience of other countries be reflected in the 
organization and policies of the Czech armed forces? 
• What are the new military requirements, and how are they changing the 
Czech military management? 
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• Based on analyses and evaluations of the previous questions, what 
recommendations can be made for the Czech military in order to properly 
function in the current military environment? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis focuses on the Czech armed forces and their decision to create 
professional forces. Through studies of other countries, which underwent the same 
process, an attempt was made to find common problems and deficiencies. There were 
limitations in the availability of information from some European countries. Also, as 
attention has just now begun to be paid to this topic, the latest information had to be taken 
from Internet sources.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
The method used is inductive analysis of current professional defense structures, 
their management and the implications for the Czech armed forces. Descriptive analysis 
is used to analyze the historical evolution of conscription and the all-volunteer force. The 
needs and reasons for changing to professional forces are shown for specific nations. 
Processes and problems were evaluated by comparative analysis. 
The information for this research is drawn from a literature search of books, 
journal articles, working papers, and Internet resources relevant to the subject.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This chapter provides a basic overview of the thesis approach and background 
information on the study. Chapter II provides a brief history of the Czech armed forces in 
light of the main events and political changes affecting the country. Chapter III discusses 
conscription and the all-volunteer system, changes in European military affairs and the 
perspectives of the Czech armed forces on this process. Chapter IV discusses the creation 
of all-volunteer forces in the United States, Great Britain and some European countries in 
the process of transformation to professional forces. Chapter V assesses the conditions in 
the Czech Republic from political, economic, social and military points of view. Chapter 
VI provides an analysis of the transformation processes, their problems, and the manner 
in which the Czech armed forces should proceed. Chapter VII summarizes the thesis and 
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II. HISTORY OF THE CZECH ARMED FORCES  
The Czech Armed Forces is a very young organization and next year will be 
celebrating the first ten years of its existence. To better understand the background of the 
Czech Armed Forces and the conditions preceding its creation, it is necessary to review 
what happened in 1918. In that year, two nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, signed the 
“Treaty of Pittsburgh”1, which formed a joint state composed of these two nations. After 
the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy on October 28, 1918, the Czechoslovak 
State was declared.2 It was also the beginning of the Armed Forces for the country’s 
defense needs. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces consisted of soldiers from the Austrian-
Hungarian Army and the Czechoslovak Legions from Russia, France and Italy. The 
Armed Forces were burdened from the beginning because of disputes over borders and 
the war with Hungary.  It was not until 1920 that they were able to unify domestic and 
foreign units.  
In the same year on February 29, 1920, the Czechoslovak Republic introduced 
compulsory military service or conscription through a constitutional document.3 The 
document stated, “Every eligible citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic is obliged to 
comply with military training and country defense”. Conscription lasted 24 months and in 
1924 was reduced to 18 months. Since then, conscription has been an essential part of the 
country’s military culture. General readiness was tested by partial mobilization in 
October 1921 against Hungary. The French military mission4, whose members occupied 
high military posts, played an essential role in creating the Czech military in the first half 
of the 1920’s.  
                                                 
1 John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane, ”Masaryk in America,” Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1991), p. 55. 
2 Jaroslav Opat, On the Emergence of Czechoslovakia, in “Czechoslovakia 1918-88, Seventy Years 
from Independence”, ed. by H. Gordon Skilling, ( St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991), pp. 41-42. 
3 http://www.psp.cz/docs/texts/constitution.1920.html - 121/1920 Sb., Zákon ze dne 29.února 1920, 
kterým se uvozuje Ústavní listina Československé Republiky, Branná Povinnost § 127; Constitutional Law 
of Czechoslovak Republic from February 29,1920, Compulsory Military Service § 127. 
4 http://vojenstvi.kvalitne.cz/armada/index.htm - Československá Armáda Léta 1918-39 – 
Czechoslovak Armed Forces 1918-39. 
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Allied treaties with France against Germany and with Yugoslavia and Romania 
against Hungary were signed. In the second half of the 1920’s, the Czech generals filled 
increasingly higher posts and the French military mission role was diminished. At the end 
of this decade, military development stagnated as a consequence of disarmament efforts 
and a reduction in military expenditures. This was especially apparent during the great 
industrial crisis at the beginning of 1930s.5 Groups of officers from the main 
headquarters prepared a plan for a radical reorganization and modernization of the Armed 
Forces. The two-year compulsory military service was introduced again, the number of 
infantry divisions was increased, the horse and mountain brigades were reorganized and a 
corps headquarters was established. In 1935, a build up of permanent fortifications began 
which was to reduce the strength of the very numerous enemy units in the case of war. 
Attention was also paid to motorization, the development of the Air Force, tanks and 
antitank defense.  
In 1935, cooperation with the Soviet Union began with the signing of the treaty of 
mutual assistance.6 The political leadership also started to support the military by trying 
to find the requested financial resources. Public prestige rose and military expenditures 
were increasing. At the end of 1930s it was approximately 8% of the GDP. At the 
beginning of 1938, the reorganization of the Armed Forces was finished. Its peacetime 
strength was more than 200,000 men. That year was characterized by intensive 
preparations for imminent war. In May 1938, partial mobilization7 was declared, as was 
general mobilization in September of the same year.8 The fully mobilized Czech Armed 
Forces had 14 corps headquarters, 37 infantry divisions, 4 mobile divisions and 
approximately 1,100,000 men.  Weapons consisted of 2,300 cannons, 350 tanks and 950 
airplanes.  
                                                 
5 Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division 1989), p. 220. 
6 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), pp. 
62-70, 136. 
7 Jaroslav Krejčí, From Ethnic to Political Nation, in Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European 
History, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990), p. 151. 
8 Jaroslav Krejčí, From Ethnic to Political Nation, in Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European 
History, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990), p. 154. 
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Despite the fact that Czechoslovakia had a security agreement and military treaty 
with France, the four great powers (Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy) agreed on 
an end of border territories without even inviting the Czechoslovak representatives to 
Munich. After the acceptance of the terms of the Munich Agreement on September 30, 
1938, Germany, Poland and Hungary occupied the borders.9 At the end of the year the 
Armed Forces were demobilized and dissolved after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 
March 1939.10 After the dissolution, many soldiers joined domestic or foreign resistance 
movements.11 Czechoslovakia was sliced up and for six years disappeared from the map 
of Europe. In December 1943, exiled President Beneš went to Moscow and signed a 
treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation between Czechoslovakia 
and the USSR. After World War II, the expeditious reconstruction of the Armed Forces 
began. The Soviet Army was accepted as the sole model for the development of the new 
Czechoslovak Army.  
The core of the forces were military units formed abroad during the war and 
complemented by newly created domestic units. Gradually, 16 infantry divisions were 
built which were complemented by tank corps and an artillery division. Also, five Air 
Force divisions were created. The Command of the Armed Forces faced shortages of 
manpower and material resources. Industry and the economy were recovering very 
slowly as a consequence of the reduced preparedness of the Army and also the Air Force. 
The military was involved in the repatriation of Germans12, and helped industry and the 
fighting with small, armed groups in the country. Due to the aforementioned economic 
problems, the Armed Forces were reorganized in 1947 but reduced in size. Downsizing 
continued for the next few years.  
 
                                                 
9 Jaroslav Opat, On the Emergence of Czechoslovakia, in ”Czechoslovakia 1918-88, Seventy Years 
from Independence”, ed. by H. Gordon Skilling, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991), pp. 112-113. 
10 Jaroslav Krejčí, In the Frontline Again, in Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, 
(St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990), p. 162. 
11  Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division 1989), p. 223. 
12 Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division 1989), p. 223-224. 
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In 1947, ”The Truman Doctrine” was announced as a new U.S. policy to protect 
nations against communism. In the same year, the European Recovery Plan known as the 
Marshall Plan13, was begun in which 22 European nations were invited to join and 
participate. The Soviet Union declined to attend and forced Czechoslovakia14, Poland and 
Hungary to also stay away. The Soviets backed the plan and at the same time communists 
overthrew the government in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.15 Czechoslovakia, like 
the other Eastern European countries, became a Soviet satellite. Bureaucratic centralism, 
under the direction of The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) leadership, was 
introduced in all spheres of public life. The new Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSLA) 
lacked competent personnel because experienced non-communist leaders were replaced 
with pro-communist commanders. The initial purge was replaced by reorganization and 
the retraining of the Armed Forces by Soviet advisers to serve the needs and goals of the 
Soviet leadership. By 1952, about 53% of the officers had to leave the Armed Forces. 
Unquestionable political loyalty was more important than professional competence for 
advancement in the military hierarchy.  
The Soviet Union assigned trusted communist party leaders to the most important 
East European military command positions despite their lack of military qualifications. 
The Army and its units used not only Soviet-made weapons and equipment but also their 
standards, regulations, organization and tactics. Soviet officers and instructors staffed the 
national military academies, and the study of Russian became mandatory for East 
European army officers. The Soviet Union also accepted many of the most promising and 
eager East European officers into Soviet mid-career military institutions and academies 
for the advanced studies essential to their promotion within the national armed forces 
command structures. A year after the communist takeover universal male conscription 
became law by drafting 18 years old men who were called up in the spring. Physical 
reasons or educational deferment were the only ways to avoid the draft.  
                                                 
13 Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division 1989), p. 224. 
14 Jaroslav Krejčí, In the Frontline Again, in Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, 
(St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990), p. 177. 
15 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
20.  
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The concentration of military forces was redirected towards the West German 
border. Leaders from Western Europe were at this time concerned about changes in the 
eastern part of Europe and especially with the Soviet Socialist Republic policies. The 
spread of communism and the forcible installation of communist governments was a 
threat to international stability and peace. The Berlin blockade in March 1948 led to 
negotiations and later to the creation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). 
NATO was created on April 4, 1949 and signed by ten western European countries, the 
United States and Canada. After the purge of the Armed Forces and society in 1948, 
another started in 1950 within the Communist Party16 and it also especially affected the 
military because higher ranking officers or officers in higher posts had to be members of 
the Communist Party. This ensured the ideological connection between the party and 
military leadership.  
The Minister of Defense, Ludvík Svoboda, was charged with treason and sent to 
work on a collective farm. In order to demonstrate their power, the Communists went so 
far as charge and execute the First Secretary of the Party, Slánský.17 The size of the 
military forces grew rapidly from 140,000 to 250,000 from 1950 to 1951. Even when 
morale was low because of the purges, they continued to strengthen the military forces by 
training and placing an increased emphasis on ideology. The new structure and reforms 
were the answer to the formation of NATO in Western Europe. In 1953, the total strength 
was 17 Army divisions, 10 Air Force divisions and 2 Air Defense divisions, which 
represented almost 300,000 men. All these changes led to joining the Warsaw Pact in 
May 14, 195518. It was officially called the “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance”. The Warsaw Pact also helped to legitimize the presence of the 
Soviet troops and overwhelming Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Unlike Hungary and 
Poland, Czechoslovakia did not participate extensively in the resistance and riots during 
the upheavals in 1956.  
                                                 
16 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
25, 31-32. 
17 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
151. 
18 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
44 –45. 
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In 1958, the Armed Forces were organized and emphasized the maneuver 
character of contemporary war based on changes in the Soviet Armed Forces. The 
reorganization included 180,000 men in 22 divisions consisting of 1 Air Defense, 15 
Army and 6 Air Force divisions. The Constitution of 196019, which replaced the original 
communist constitution of 1948, converted the Czechoslovak Republic into the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. According to the Constitution, “defense of the country 
and its socialist social order” was the “supreme duty and a matter of honor for every 
citizen.” Citizens were “duty bound” to serve in the armed forces as prescribed by law. 
The law provided for a system of universal male conscription. In early the 1960s, the 
Czechoslovak Armed Forces went through a modernization procedure to support the new 
Soviet strategy in its primary role on the western border with NATO countries. In the first 
half of the 1960s, forces were equipped with operational and tactical rockets. A new more 
powerful and better-educated force was built and trained to fulfill its role within the 
Warsaw Pact. It was estimated that Czechoslovakia would bear 60-70% of the casualties 
in case of war against NATO and would also be a nuclear battlefield.  
During this time, pressure was put on the government to allow the installation of 
nuclear warheads and the relocation of more Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. 
After this proposal was refused, tensions between the two governments grew. Also, the 
requirements placed on the Czech military were increasing and general dissatisfaction 
with conditions and an aversion to their political education was spreading among the 
officers.  After the Czechoslovak economy began to stagnate at the beginning of the 
1960s20, and because of pressure from Moscow and the party itself, a reform movement 
was created to address bureaucratic control and ideological conformity. In some 
government posts, younger and more liberal members of the communist party replaced 
the hard-liners. The Czechoslovak government rejected a request from Moscow for more 
military integration of the Warsaw Treaty in 1966 after the Romanian government 
rejected it.21  
                                                 
19 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
45. 
20 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
46. 
21 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, ( St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), 
p. 88. 
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Liberalization also affected the Armed Forces and great structural changes were 
discussed to reflect democratic changes in society. During the ”Prague Spring” in 1968, 
plans were created to democratize the Armed Forces, including limiting the authority of 
the communist party. The national military doctrine specified in the Action Program of 
the Ministry of Defense and by Memorandum of Military Political Academy stated that 
the defense of the country should be based on its own geopolitical interests. The main 
idea behind the documents was that the threat from the West was overstated, and was not 
so apparent as was perceived. In a televised news conference, at the height of the 1968 
crisis, the chief of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's military department, 
Lieutenant General Václav Prchlík, denounced the Warsaw Pact as an unequal alliance, 
and declared that the Czechoslovak Army was prepared to defend the country's 
sovereignty by force, if necessary. First Secretary of the Party Alexander Dubček22 tried 
to assure Moscow of its country’s loyalty to the Warsaw Pact but he was not convincing 
enough to prevent the invasion on August 20, 1968. That day, military forces numbering 
500,000 from Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria, led by 
Soviet Union troops, invaded Czechoslovakia.  
On August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia was occupied by these invading forces 
without any resistance.23 Ludvík Svoboda24, now President of the country, announced 
that the Warsaw Pact force entered the country without the approval of the Czech 
government. On the contrary, the Soviets claimed that they were invited to preserve 
socialism. The Czech Armed Forces did not participate because authorities confined them 
to their barracks. All military installations had been surrounded by troops, but according 
to orders from the Warsaw Pact command, they had not been disarmed. After three 
weeks, the forces were pulled back from military installations on October 16, 1968 and 
part of the Warsaw Pact forces were withdrawn. Only Soviet forces stayed in the western 
part of the Czech Socialist Republic with a force of four ground divisions.  
                                                 
22 H. Gordon Skilling, Lions and Foxes: Heroes or Lackeys?, in “Czechoslovakia 1918-88, Seventy 
Years from Independence”, ed. by H. Gordon Skilling, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991), pp. 10-11. 
23 Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division 1989) p. 225. 
24 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
47. 
12 
During negotiations with the Soviets, a reduction in the number of Armed Forces 
was requested in order to stop military personnel from supporting reform in1968. Due to 
the changes in society, the military was divided into pro-reform and pro-Communist 
factors. After the collapse of the Dubček regime, Husák25 was appointed the new First 
Secretary of the Party in early 1969. His government started to regain control over the 
Armed Forces, and a new purge was carried out.26 In first months after the invasion, 
about 58% of all army officers under 30 years of age resigned and by June 1969, an 
estimated 50% of all students in the country's military academies had also resigned. 
When the purge was completed in 1975, about 11,000 officers and 30,000 NCOs had 
been dismissed. The overall strength of the Army was reduced by one-third, and the Air 
Force by one-half. The manpower shortage had to be remedied with lower qualification 
requirements, and by material and career incentives. Overall strength dropped from 
240,000 in1966 to 168,000 in1969. Both society and the Armed Forces suffered from 
apathy, and the prestige of the military disappeared in the eyes of the public and the 
military itself.  
Despite the purges of possibly unreliable personnel and the redoubling of 
propaganda efforts in military schools and training programs, some outside observers in 
the 1970s and 1980s questioned the reliability of the Czechoslovak forces in the event of 
an East-West conflict. The most frequent questions concerned their reliability in a 
prolonged offensive war in Western Europe or in a war that was going badly for Warsaw 
Pact forces. Other outside analysts, however, believed that the Czechoslovak armed 
forces were well trained, well equipped, and well motivated and that they were capable of 
carrying their share of Warsaw Pact operations, particularly in defense of their homeland. 
In May 1970, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,27 which incorporated the principle of limited 
sovereignty.  
                                                 
25 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
195. 
26 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
48. 
27 http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/czechoslovakia/czechoslovakia52.html, 
Czechoslovakia Country Study, Normalization, 1987. 
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            Soviet troops remained stationed in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak armed 
forces worked in close cooperation with the Warsaw Pact command. Soviet advisers 
supervised the functioning of the Ministry of Interior and the security apparatus.             
During the 1970s and 1980s, Husák and his government tried to maintain conformity and 
obedience in all aspects of life. Consumerism and materialism were encouraged by a 
corrupt regime, and it caused cynicism, greed, nepotism, corruption and a lack of 
discipline at work. The Soviets continued to exert control over Czechoslovak internal 
affairs, including the police and security apparatus. Five Soviet ground divisions and two 
air divisions had become a permanent fixture, while the Czechoslovak military was 
further integrated into the Warsaw Pact. Any independent action was taken as defiance 
and the response to such activity was harassment, persecution, and, in some instances, 
imprisonment. Increasing tensions in relations between the USSR and United States or 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact was pervasive during the 1980s.  New Soviet units were 
stationed in the country with nuclear weapon carriers.  
            On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was selected as the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Soon after assuming office, Gorbachev began 
a policy of “restructuring” (perestroika) the Soviet economy and advocated “openness” 
(‘glasnost') in the discussion of economic, social, and, to some extent, political questions. 
For a government wholly dedicated to the preservation of the status quo, subjects such as 
“openness”, “economic restructuring,” and “reform” had been taboo. Huge military 
expenditures forced the USSR to the negotiation table with the United States and in 1987 
an agreement was signed on the reduction of nuclear weapons. From 1987, Czech 
conscripts were by law serving for two years in the ground forces and for three years in 
the air forces. Any intentional avoidance was subject to a prison sentence of up to five 
years. Conscripts were obligated after the completion of their service to stay in the 
reserve forces until the age of 50. Peace initiatives with the USSR beginning in 1988 
resulted in a reduction in the number of conventional weapons and personnel by 500,000 
and 10 divisions.  
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            By 1988, student demonstrations were organized, and change was demanded. Just 
about one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall28, the end to communism in 
Czechoslovakia became a reality. The six-week period between November 17 and 
December 29, 198929 brought about the bloodless overthrow of the Czechoslovak 
communist regime.30Armed Forces were on alert in barracks but were not used because 
communist representatives were overwhelmed by the mass of people calling for 
democracy even though there were plans ready for military intervention. After the Cold 
War, a large number of officers left the military as they no longer shared the values of the 
service. Compulsory military service was reduced from 24 to 18 months, and civil service 
legislation was introduced. After the end of the Cold War, a dilemma appeared. What is 
the next step in the security of Europe and what are the roles of organizations such as 
NATO in these new conditions? The Warsaw Pact was dissolved on June 1, 1991 and 
NATO lost its main goal of collective defense against the communist threat. Some 
politicians predicted that this was the end of NATO and there was no need for this type of 
organization.  
            To stay viable and meaningful for its own members, it had to change its goals and 
principals to define its new role, although, on the basis of Article 5 (collective defense 
commitment). Soon after the Cold War, NATO started dialogs with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.31 Meanwhile, Eastern European countries were looking for 
security arrangements in the vacuum between NATO and Russia. In February 1991, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, called the ”Visegrad Group”, agreed on a joint 
approach to security and foreign policy issues for better integration in Western European 
democratic civilization. The ”Velvet Revolution” was successfully completed with the 
departure of the last Soviet troops in May 1991, and free parliamentary elections were 
held in June 1992. The dissident and playwright, Václav Havel, was elected president.  
                                                 
28 Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 
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29 Martin A. Smith, NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000), p. 100. 
30 Martin A. Smith, NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000), p. 103. 
31 Martin A. Smith, NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000), p. 105. 
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            The new government was forced to create a new military doctrine to fit the 
current conditions and circumstances of the country. Most of the attention was paid to 
economic changes while military needs were left for a later date. New threats, conditions 
and the history of the Armed Forces and the defense needs of the country indicated that a 
small Armed Forces be incorporated into European collective defense structures.             
The most visible and viable defense formation in Europe was the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Lessons learned mainly from the Persian Gulf have resulted in 
changed in NATO’s structure, which stressed the use of rapid reaction forces and the new 
concept of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Václav Havel, as the new president of 
Czechoslovakia and the first leader of a Warsaw Pact country, visited NATO 
headquarters in March 1991.32 He stated that the Czechoslovak Federative Republic 
would welcome cooperation and the exchange of information at different levels 
especially in security matters, broadened contacts between respective military officials as 
well as cooperation in science, information technology and environment protection. This 
search for security and safety became more important after the 1991 coup attempt against 
President Gorbachev.  
            The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)33 was created to promote 
cooperation between NATO countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 
security and related issues. Six months after the country's first regular nationwide 
elections in more than 40 years, on January 1, 1993, the Czechoslovak state was 
peacefully divided into the independent countries of the Czech and Slovak Republics due 
to “irreconcilable differences”, thus, a 74-year-old federation was dissolved.34 With the 
division of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic, the Czech Republic continued to 
privatize industry35 and strengthen democratic control. The entire society was changing 
its social, economic and political dimensions. When the division occurred, the 
Czechoslovak Armed Forces strength was 169,000 men and 13 divisions.  
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            The new Czech Armed Forces inherited two thirds of the personnel and 
equipment of the former Czechoslovak Army. The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic 
(ACR) consisted of Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense Forces. The assigned 
strength by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty for the new Czech 
forces was about 93,000 men, 957 tanks, 1,367 armored personal vehicles, and 767 
artillery systems above 100mm, 230 airplanes and 50 helicopters. In 1993, the Armed 
Forces were facing problems with the aging Soviet equipment and practices. The Czech 
military leadership had created the Concept for ACR development by 1996, but the 
decreased military budget influenced the entire process of implementation.  The 
Partnership for Peace (PfP)36 program began in January 1994 at Brussels after the NATO 
summit. It was the basis for the practical security cooperation between NATO and 
individual Partner countries (19+1) in the NACC framework. Activities included defense 
planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations.  
            The Czech Republic was very actively involved in PfP from the beginning and 
sought firm security arrangements. At the time of the creation of PfP, NATO members 
officially commenced a debate on enlargement. At that time, it was stated that active 
participation in PfP would play an important role in the expansion of NATO but without 
further clarification about what it meant. The idea of PfP constituting a possible path to 
NATO membership was allegedly accepted later under pressure from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. In January 1995, the Partnership for Peace Planning and 
Review Process (PARP)37, developed from PfP, began to develop procedures resembling 
NATO force-planning process. Under these conditions, most problems with joint 
exercises were related to language skills. In December 1995, the Czech Armed Forces 
were deployed to Bosnia as a part of the multinational NATO-led peace Implementation 
Force (IFOR).  
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            At the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8, 1997, the decision was made to invite 
three potential candidates, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, to accession talks 
with NATO.38 The Protocol on Accession of the Czech Republic to NATO was signed in 
Brussels on December 16, 1997.  Until April 1999, when the first accession was due, on 
the 50th anniversary of NATO, these countries were to be involved in Alliance activities 
to the maximum extent in order to be prepared for membership. Target Force Goals39 
were set for these three countries with specific tasks to bring them closer to 
interoperability with NATO countries. The Czechs were the founding members of 
NATO's Partnership for Peace and have participated in at least 27 joint exercises with the 
United States and other allies, including a series of exercises with the Texas National 
Guard. NATO officials have praised Czech military capabilities and the contributions 
they are already making to Western security. On March 12, 1999, the Czech Republic, 
together with Poland and Hungary, were admitted into NATO as member countries.40 
The Czech military has downsized substantially since the days of the Warsaw Pact and 
has adopted a modernization strategy with emphasis on communication, intelligence, 
English skills, and command and control.  
            Czech soldiers served alongside U.S. soldiers in the Gulf War, and a mechanized 
infantry battalion was serving with distinction in the British SFOR sector in Bosnia. The 
Czechs were among the largest per capita contributors to SFOR. The Czech military has 
also been active in UN peacekeeping and sent forces to UNTAES in Croatia and a 
number of other UN operations in countries of the former Soviet Union, Middle East and 
Africa. The strength of the Armed Forces on December 1, 1999 was about 65,000 
soldiers, 792 tanks, 1,367 APCs, 740 artillery systems above 100mm, 204 airplanes, of 
which 110 were combat aircraft, and 117 helicopters, of which 34 were combat 
helicopters. The Czech Republic’s first year of NATO membership resulted in a very 
positive appreciation of the Czech soldiers’ participation in international missions in the 
Balkans by NATO representatives.  
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            It also gained 50% of the trust of the public in the Armed Forces, which is the 
highest percentage ever achieved in a public opinion poll among Czech citizens. 
Nevertheless, there have also been problems concerning the acquisition of equipment, 
and the controversial posture of the Government towards the allied air campaign against 
Serbian targets. In February 2000, the Czech Republic, for the first time as a full member, 
passed NATO joint screening, which is a joint discussion of proposals, which will lead to 
Force Goals for the Czech armed forces. The Alliance decided to discuss about 130 Force 
Goals with the Czech Republic for the period of 2001 to 2003 with some perspectives in 
2006. The Czech Armed Forces faced some difficulties. For example, the delayed 
purchase of the L-159 aircraft constitute over 70% of this year’s investments and the 
percentage will be even higher in the following years. In this context, it is important that 
the Czech defense industry is gradually integrated into Western defense industry 
structures. In spite of the problems with the security screening of Czech representatives in 
NATO, the participation of several hundred Czech soldiers in international missions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo and the activities of the field hospital in the Balkans and in Turkey 
were highly appreciated. According to the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Šedivý, the 
trend of the future is the full professionalization of the Czech Armed Forces, which is 
primarily a political decision.  
            What the Czech Republic can offer to its allies, besides soldiers, equipment and 
training areas, is its experience with NATO accession. Within the Alliance, the CR 
supports the ”open door” policy towards other Central and Eastern European countries. 
After two years of membership, the Czech Republic was criticized about its unclear 
policy regarding conscription, problems with planning and acquisition, as well as 
obsolete equipment. Due to the continuous problems, especially budgetary, at the 
Ministry of Defense in 2001, a new Minister of Defense was appointed. This is the sixth 
Minister of Defense since 1993 and every one of them had his own ideas concerning the 
reorganization of the military. By the time their plans were beginning to be implemented, 
they were leaving office. None of them had a clear picture of the new perspectives of the 
forces. The new minister started with radical and fundamental changes in the military. He 
was the initiator and supporter of the professional forces.  
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            A Center for Reform was established, and a plan for the transition of Armed 
Forces to a fully professional force (AVF) was mandated by the parliament. In the words 
of the representative of the Center, the “New Czech Armed Forces should be small, 
young and mobile”. The Czech Republic, its political representation and also the 
Parliament, are faced with radical measures in areas of changes implemented in the 
Armed Forces and problems of deep and radical reform. This is the biggest challenge in 
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III. NEW TRENDS IN EUROPE 
A. CONSCRIPTION VS. VOLUNTEERS 
What is conscription and what is its purpose? Basically, conscription is system of 
compulsory enrollment of men and women into the Armed Forces. Conscription of 
women is rare, but there are a few examples from WW II. In Great Britain, for example, 
young single women were subject to conscription.41 The other example is from Israel. 
Jewish women were already subject to conscription at 18 years of age as early as 
September 1949.42 These women are in units called “The Women’s Corps” and usually 
serve in clerical and secretarial positions, technical and mechanical trades, educational 
and cultural positions, and operational non-combatant roles.  Married women, mothers 
and religious women are exempt from service. The initial period of conscription was 24 
months, but it was eventually reduced to 20 months. Reserve service is obligatory for 
childless women up to age 34. In actuality, most women are exempted. However, the 
basic role of conscription was and it is still fulfilled by young men.       
Conscripts may be called upon to serve in times of peace in order to train for war 
or in times of emergency. Conscription is known as compulsory military service. In the 
United States it is called the “the draft” and by legislative enactment, Selective Service. 
This fundamental obligation of citizenship comes from ancient Greek city-states where 
young men were required to serve in the citizen militia for several years. In the early 
Roman Republic, compulsory service was regarded as a privilege and men between the 
ages of 17 and 60 served without pay. If a man did not serve, punishment was 
imprisonment and confiscation of property. At the end of the 2nd century B.C., 
professionals and mercenaries replaced the citizen militia. Conscription in its modern 
form was introduced in France during the first republic where universal military service 
was a Republican duty, and also a necessity for national survival. The men who had to 
serve were between the ages of 18 and 25. After registration in their localities, the 
youngest eligible were called up first and the others according to current needs.  
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In 1808, Prussia introduced universal conscription. In 1815, no exceptions were 
made due to social class or payments, and all young men had to serve a specified term of 
duty. In the 20th century, conscription began to become less useful. Compulsory 
education replaced military service and weapons became more technical requiring 
professionals to operate them. Armies, therefore, could not absorb all the young men of a 
growing population. As a result, abuses in granting exemptions and deferments became 
common. In WWI, the Great Powers fought with conscripted military forces. Great 
Britain used volunteers until 1916 when they resorted to compulsion. Britain abolished 
conscription in 1962.43 The United States imposed the Selective Service Act of 1917 
upon entering WWI. Volunteers were the basis of the Canadian forces until 1918 before 
they changed to conscription. Universal military service was abolished according to the 
Versailles Treaty and voluntary enlistment was established in Germany.44 However, in 
1935, Germany reintroduced the compulsory military system.  
The British Parliament adopted a Conscription Act in May 1939, which 
established a system of peacetime military training. At the beginning of World War II, a 
law was issued requiring conscription of all males between 18 and 41. Peacetime 
conscription in the United States was established in September 1940. The Selective 
Service Act of 1948 was the basic draft law for the Cold War era.45 Then, the same basic 
system provided manpower for the war in Vietnam. In 1969, a lottery system for 
choosing draftees was introduced. In June 1973, an all-volunteer force was introduced. 
Conscription is still used in some Western European countries such as Scandinavia 
(Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark) Greece, Germany, Switzerland and Austria.  It is 
the basic system for manning the Armed Forces in Eastern Europe. However, the 
growing reluctance of young people causes more of them to opt for an alternative civilian 
service if it is available. 
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Volunteer forces or professional forces are also known in the United States as the 
All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The transition from conscription was the result of public 
opinion. More than 3,000,000 men volunteered to serve in the British Armed Forces 
during the first two years of the war. Due to heavy losses, the British government decided 
to introduce conscription by passing the Military Service Act.46 At first, only single men 
were called up but by 1918, because of a lack of people, married men of fifty were being 
conscripted into the army. After the Military Service Act was passed, the No-
Conscription Fellowship mounted a vigorous campaign against the punishment and 
imprisonment of conscientious objectors. During this time about 16,000 men refused to 
fight. Most of these men were pacifists, who believed that even during wartime, it was 
wrong to kill another human being.  
The United States, the second major power, employed a volunteer system. The 
draft was mainly used because of shortages of volunteers and during major emergencies 
such as wars, and usually created opposition and riots. The first U.S. draft occurred 
during the Civil War47. The only conflict fought without a draft was the Spanish 
American War in 1898. The last change to the volunteer force occurred in 1973 when a 
strong public antiwar movement from Vietnam War still existed. Both countries are still 
providing military service on a volunteer basis. Both of them also resorted to using the 
draft during WWI and WWII during emergencies. There are differences in perceptions 
concerning these two military systems and studies of these concepts are still being 
debated. In particular, there are studies provided by countries looking for more efficient 
military systems. In the United States, debates are still ongoing about the relative 
efficiency of an all-volunteer force and draft as are comparisons of these two alternatives. 
These issues regularly surface during conflicts and emergencies. The last time was after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. The 
main policy question is how these military systems can be beneficial and what are their 
drawbacks.  
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It is difficult to compare conscripts and all-volunteer forces either in cost or 
quality. Conscription usually means lower budgetary costs because of shifting costs from 
taxpayers to conscripts who are serving for much lower wages than volunteers. Due to 
the shorter period of service, they have lower skills than professional soldiers and 
generally are less capable. On the other hand, the social aspects of spreading the burden 
across all social groups to defend nations and bind the military to society are stressed. 
Since conscription is cheaper, the military can maintain a higher numerical strength. 
Conscription also tends to encourage reliance on very junior personnel because of their 
increased availability and lower cost. However, today’s soldiers are expected to do more 
than just fight. They must also be able to accomplish modern peacekeeping missions 
requiring diplomatic, security, and managerial and administrative skills.  
So what are the requirements of the future armed forces of NATO nations? 
• Quick out-of-area deployment capability for sustained periods of operation  
• Highly skilled professional forces  
• Interoperability with the NATO armed forces 
• Mobilization capacities with reserve forces 
• Efficient supply (hospitals, transportation, etc.) 
• Motivation and morale of forces deployed abroad 
Another question is what kind of army is needed in the 21st century? 
The answer, based on the experiences of the United Kingdom and the United 
States and other Western European countries, is professional forces. However, are they 
feasible for small countries with slowly developing economies, especially in Central and 
Eastern Europe? In these matters, the cultural and social perception of the military is a 
major consideration as are new managerial requirements and budgetary costs.   
One definition of military professionalization is improved capability to carry out 
its mission, increased discipline of members and accountability for their actions.48  
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The budgetary cost of volunteer or compulsory forces includes: 
• Manpower 
• Infrastructure 
• Operations and maintenance  
• Procurement of new equipment 
• Research and development 
All categories of cost are increasing and driving down the size of forces. 
Conscripts are relatively cheap in terms of cash but have a high social cost when taking 
into account that the young people are removed from education and other productive 
work. Conscripts suffer a low standard of living, need little support and are 
unaccompanied by family. Professional soldiers must be paid a rate comparable to the 
commercial world, provided with housing and support for a family. Otherwise, they will 
leave for better conditions elsewhere.  On the other hand, the conscript is always 
available for service and gets little leave.    
“We have lived with the draft so long,” declared Richard M. Nixon during his 
campaign for the Presidency, “that too many of us accept it as normal and necessary.”49 
Proponents of the draft argue that each citizen has a moral responsibility, or duty, to serve 
his country and that the draft provided a vehicle for institutionalizing this responsibility. 
Draft advocates usually stress affordability as well. The other concern is the fully 
professional, non-citizen force could be a threat to civilian authority and individual 
freedom.  Also controversial, is the issue of lower income individuals, and individuals 
with lower levels of education, joining the volunteer force. Finally, conscripted forces 
usually have higher personnel turnover rates than the all-volunteer force because 
conscription generally decreases the average length of service. 
B. EUROPE IN TRANSITION 
After the Cold War and fall of the Soviet Union, the whole atmosphere in Europe 
started to change. Also, reunification of Germany was not a big surprise when 
cooperation between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe was stressed.  
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The armed forces of European countries were no longer suitable for meeting new 
threats. Large armed forces, based on conscription and large-scale mobilization, and 
designed to fight in defense of national territory, were now an anachronism. In response, 
NATO countries sought to maintain their own sovereign armed forces with national 
chains of command, national procurement systems and balanced forces organized on 
individualistic national lines. The natural response from Western European countries was 
a decline in military budgets and expenditures.  Since the end of the Cold War, European 
countries have reduced their armed forces from 10 to 50%. Organizations such as NATO, 
looking for new identities, are also individual countries trying to adapt their own forces to 
new conditions. Reductions are the consequences of budget cuts and the search for 
efficiency. New doctrines must describe new requirements and the needs of transformed 
armed forces better. New threat analyses refer to experiences from the Persian Gulf and 
the Balkans where well-equipped and rapidly deployed forces are necessary.  
Today's threats to national security in Europe are primarily non-military in nature, 
although, there is a fear of a regional war in the Balkans. Overall defense concepts are no 
longer connected with large standing armies. The focus is on creating smaller, more 
mobile units for rapid deployment in crisis situations. Except for the British Armed 
Forces, all other European countries operated under the conscription system. This 
concept conflicted with the use of conscripted forces in out-of-area operations. The 
policy of countries was to use conscripted forces only in activities connected with the 
defense of their own country, which was inconsistent with out of the area operations. This 
solution is volunteers who are suitable for this type of operation. Some of the countries 
felt that the most efficient way was to create professional forces ready for deployment. 
When forces become more flexible, versatile, and capable of operations abroad, costs 
increase and the size of the force that can be afforded decreases. It is not easy to estimate 
the size of forces just by looking at the British forces, which are the most experienced 
operating volunteer force. Britain has had a volunteer force since 1962. Since the end of 
the Cold War, they have reduced the strength of the military by 30% and are planning 
further reductions. The first European country to abolish conscription after the Cold War 
was Belgium in 1992.  
 
27 
A few years later, the Netherlands abandoned the draft and, on August 31, 1996, 
achieved a fully professional force. Paragraph 1 in the Dutch constitution states: “For the 
protection of the interests of the state, there are armed forces exclusively consisting of 
volunteers and possibly of conscripts”. Conscription is still a possibility. During the same 
year, France started to transforms its forces and at the end of last year became fully 
professional. It was a feature of military life for more than two centuries. In France, it 
represents a shift from the old Gaullist doctrine of military independence towards 
Europeanisation of a country's armed forces. It was a time for change according to 
President Chirac who announced in 1996 the transformation of forces from traditional 
conscription to a professional system (“Model 2015”).50 The professionalization of the 
forces was accomplished at the end of 2001.  
Spain announced the end of conscription and a change to fully professional forces 
on January 1, 2002 and is trying to resolve the problem of financing these forces. 
Conscription in Spain ended after 230 years. King Carlos III introduced conscription in 
1770. One of the problems of this change was that 75% of the young men eligible for the 
draft declared themselves to be conscientious objectors.51 Portugal has a plan to introduce 
professional forces in 2003. Italy announced the end of conscription in 2005 when the 
Italian senate voted unanimously to abolish compulsory military service in 2000. They 
felt that their military should be more professional and efficient. They are planning to 
reduce the armed forces from 270,000 to 190,000 volunteers.52 It will end the long 
history of conscription, which started with the establishment of the country in 1861. In 
time of war or an international crisis, conscription can be reactivated. All this processes 
and changes preceded the announcement of an end to conscription by the Czech 
Republic.  
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Other countries with a long history of conscription, such as Austria and Greece, 
began discussions about phasing out conscription. Germany, for political reasons,53 
continues conscription but the length of service was reduced to nine months. More than 
half of the 300,000 draftees in 1997 chose alternative civilian service. They are moving 
towards professional forces very cautiously as conscription played a critical role in 
rehabilitation after WWII. Under German reforms, military strength will be reduced from 
338,000 to 285,000 by 200454 with a higher fraction of volunteers. Switzerland and 
Scandinavian countries also continue to use conscripted forces. However, even 
Switzerland is planning to decrease the number of forces by two thirds by 2003 and 
reduce initial service from 300 to 280 days.  
Until now, professionalization was mostly seen in NATO countries followed by 
CEE countries experiencing relatively good economic conditions. However, some NATO 
countries still consider conscripted forces to be the basic means of the country. Central 
and Eastern European countries (C&EE) continue to maintain far too large an 
administrative, command and military education infrastructure which is consuming a 
large part of the defense budget. The human resources system is not providing proper 
evaluation, rewarding, promoting and posting of information about key jobs, and there is 
no clear career system. There is a lack of competent people in defense policy formulation, 
defense planning and crisis management.    
C. CZECH ARMED FORCES PERSPECTIVES 
From the time the Czech Armed Forces joined NATO, many changes were 
occurring to fulfill membership requirements. Multinational peace operations are 
becoming more important for today's national security. Professional skills are required to 
achieve a high level of efficiency of troops in these operations. However, operational 
capabilities are reduced by an inadequate structure of personnel and over-inflated 
command at the expense of combat units. The Czech military in 2001 still has nearly half 
of the forces filled by conscripts who cannot serve outside of national borders.  
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Conscriptive service is becoming harder to maintain because of demographic 
changes. Even when conscription is a traditional form of service, many problems still 
exist. During the Cold War era, young people were forced to serve, and avoidance was 
seen as a violation of the law and punishable by imprisonment. After the revolution in 
1989, human rights were more of an issue in society and an alternative civilian service55 
was introduced. This enabled young people of specific religions and pacifistic beliefs to 
serve their country without the use of weapons. More and more young people today are 
asking for alternative civil service, where they usually work as assistants in hospitals, 
clinics and elderly homes. Also, the social situation in the Czech Republic makes it 
difficult to man the armed forces. For example, only 15.5% of college students reported 
for service in 2000. With a new Minister of Defense, Jaroslav Tvrdík, appointed in May 
2001 because of persistent problems at the Ministry, the restructuring of the armed forces 
started to become a reality. With the downsizing of the Ministry of Defense and General 
Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, the transition to professional armed forces was 
introduced. 
The Center for Preparation of Czech Armed Forces Reform was established and 
Major General Jaroslav Škopek was appointed by the government of the Czech Republic 
as a government commissioner for the preparation of military reform on May 15, 2001. 
The Center prepared the preliminary plan for the execution of reform in cooperation with 
advisors from Western Europe and the United States. The reform is planned in three 
phases and will end in 2010 with the modernization project of the armed forces.  Table 1 
illustrates the preliminary plan for reform with phases and goals established during 
phases in a tentative time frame. By the end of 2006, the professional armed forces of the 
Czech Republic will achieve the required initial capabilities which will lead to the 
creation of conditions for achieving the full operational capabilities in the future 






                                                 
55 http://www.oku-fm.cz/info_obcan/ziv_situace/civilni_sluzba.htm - Právní úprava - civilní služba, 
Law Amendment about Alternative Civilian Service. 
30 
Table 1.   Phases of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 
 
Phase Measures 
Set priorities for professionalization, conduct economic 
analyses and assessment of available resources – financial, human, 
materiel 
Prepare a proposal for immediate termination, change or 
inhibition of projects, which are in contradiction with the reform plan
Prepare plan of priority projects and programs to modernize 
armament, equipment and infrastructure in accordance with armed 
forces professionalization, continue projects already under way, 
which are in harmony with the reform plan 
Start intensive communication campaign to support the 
reform and professionalization 
PREPARATION PHASE 
UNTIL THE END OF MARCH 
2002  
Prepare the Concept of Development of Professional Army 
of the Czech Republic and Concept of Mobilization of the Armed 
Forces of the Czech Republic to be submitted to the Government of 
the Czech Republic 
Prepare draft of legislative changes necessary to support the 
armed forces professionalization and start legislative process, so that 
new laws (amendments) become effective by January 1, 2004  
Prepare reform implementation plan (by July 2002) – to be 
submitted to the Minister of Defense for approval  
Prepare intradepartmental implementation documents to 
carry out tasks connected with the reform (orders, directives of the 
Minister of Defense, plans) 
Implement necessary adjustments within organizational 
structure of top management and military command bodies  (MOD, 
GS, dissolve operational command level) 
Continue already started professionalization of NATO 
assigned units  
FIRST PHASE 2002 to 
2003 
Continue reconstruction and development of needed 
infrastructure  
Finish professionalization of NATO assigned troops  
Start professionalization of territorial and support forces  
Start implementation of modernization projects of the first 
group of priorities 
 SECOND PHASE 2004 
to 2005 
Assess and update the reform plan 
Achieve initial operational capabilities of professional 
armed forces  
Complete implementation of modernization projects of the 
first group of priorities 
Start the second phase of infrastructure development 
THIRD PHASE 2006 to 
2007 
Start implementation of modernization projects of the 
second group of priorities to increase combat capabilities of 
mechanized division  
Complete implementation of modernization projects of the 
second group of priorities 
Start implementation of modernization projects of the third 
group of priorities to increase combat capabilities of air force and air 
defense (supersonic aircraft, long-range air defense systems) 
Finish the second phase of the infrastructure development 
COMPLETION OF AF 
CR MODERNIZATION 2008 to 
2010 
Achieve full operational capabilities of professional armed 
forces 
From: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/etapy.htm
- Phases of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic
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The process of preparation includes the creation of a “Concept of the Build-up the 
Professional Armed Forces of the Czech Republic” and a “Concept of Mobilization of the 
Armed Forces of the Czech Republic”. These documents should be approved by July 
2002 and be the basis for the Plan of the Reform and Directive of the Minister of 
Defense. The objective is to make the Czech Armed Forces an efficient member of the 
Alliance capable of fulfilling all tasks associated with NATO operations. The goal is to 
create peacetime forces with strength of 34,000 to 36,000 active soldiers consisting of 
19,000 to 20,000 enlisted personnel, 8,000 to 9,000 warrant officers, and approximately 
7,000 officers.56 The number of women should be about 7,000, which is one fifth of the 
total strength, and 10,000 civilian employees. Today, the strength of the armed forces is 
48,000 active soldiers and 21,000 civilian employees. The wartime structure will be 
based on Article 5 operation scenario against a direct threat to the territory of the Czech 
Republic. Expected reserves for mobilization are 28,000 personnel.  
The Armed Forces are planning to attract 5,000 new recruits annually. The Czech 
Armed Forces started with the development of a new system of recruiting for future 
professionals during 2001 based on human resources marketing. It will be a new 
experience to compete for new employees with other opportunities existing in the free 
labor market. There is still a lack of experience with the integrated selection system 
involving medical, mental, and physical and motivation factors of candidates. The armed 
forces have created 13 recruitment centers and are preparing a methodology for selection. 
The selection procedure will consist of administrative, physical, medical, psychological 
and academic sections. A center for personal marketing57 was created to a support a 
centralized system of recruitment and selection. The center analyzes the labor market, 
investigates the attitudes and lifestyle of the young people and provides them with 
information about military occupations and careers, and develops selection methods and 
criteria for job assignments. The 13 centers are running experimental operations to verify 
methods and criteria.  
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Next year, two selection centers will be officially opened. The role of military 
education is considered and the education system will be reformed to create the 
foundations for the efficient promotion of professional skills and knowledge. The idea is 
to establish an efficient system of education related to the career requirements of 
professional soldiers. The military education and training system is just now undergoing 
a reduction with a plan to retain one high school and one military university. The priority 
of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic is to better fulfill the assignments in a NATO 
environment, which is clearly laid out in Table 1 where NATO assigned forces are 
already supposed to be ready and fully operational in 2004. The public perception of 
NATO membership is more a passive joining than a qualitative change in defense. The 
public is still not aware of NATO duties and commitments, and there has been no change 
in thinking, behavior, cultural relationships and management methods. However, the 
reform of the armed forces should enable the military to face current security threats, as 
well as to provide territorial defense of the country and its citizens. Financial resources 



















IV. ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
Volunteer forces are now working or being transformed in most Western 
European countries. They are also being recognized in CEE countries and many started to 
compare them with their traditional conscripted forces and are working on cost-benefit 
analyses and other studies. The reason for this change to volunteers, the transformation of 
the forces and the problems associated with this change must be determined.   
A. U.S. ARMED FORCES 
The U.S. Armed Forces have been the most powerful force since the end of the 
Cold War. They are also the most experienced forces in both high and low intensity 
combat operations. Except for some compulsory militia training and occasional 
temporary drafts in wartime, traditionally Americans have mainly had a volunteer 
military.58 However, conscription is as old as the War of Independence at Concord 
in1775. Washington’s perception of defense and its sharing is stated thus: 
It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system that 
every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government owes not 
only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the 
defense of it.59  
The rights and obligations of citizens were supposed to form the future tradition 
of participation in the armed forces. This concept was against individual rights and their 
freedom to choose. After the Revolutionary War, a plan to have all 19 year olds trained 
during three summers was suggested by George Washington. He foresaw, with the idea 
that every able-bodied man should serve, the future of conscription as a supplement to the 
regular Army in times of need. The Knox plan a few years later tried to justify universal 
service on the basis of a citizen’s right to bear arms but it was never implemented. The 
government has generally not seen the need for large standing armies during peacetime 
particularly given the geographical position of the United States. In this light, they 
continued to provide defense capabilities through the militia.  
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During the War of 1812, an attempt was made to establish compulsory selective 
service for male citizens. This law was supposed to be directly enforced without approval 
of the states. As this was a controversial issue, Congress delayed action until the war 
ended and did not approve it. Strong opposition to the draft came to a head in the New 
England states, where they refused to raise a militia and threatened to secede from the 
Union. At the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln called for volunteers from 
the state militia but the three-month term made the numbers insufficient. The President 
renewed the call, but for three-year volunteers. Since the number of forces was reduced 
because of casualties, desertion and diseases and the enlistment rate was slow, the Militia 
Act of 1862 required the states to furnish men, and through a draft if necessary. There 
was opposition to the Militia Act because of the poor management of manpower 
procurement. The Federal Government enacted the Enrollment Act in 1863, which was 
the first U.S. draft law.60 Under this law, an exemption could be bought for $300. The 
Army used this money to obtain a substitute. Also, wealthy people were able to pay 
others to serve for them. Bounties as high as $1500 were paid and out of 250,000 draft 
notices, 46,000 actual inductees were recruited.  
During WWI, America enacted the Selective Service Act of 1917. Conscription 
became the main recruiting method. Voluntary enlistment was halted because the draft 
produced enough people. All men were classified into five categories according to their 
value to the civil sector. The highest category consisted of those who possessed the 
greatest civilian earning opportunities and the lowest category had the least. People from 
the lowest classes were drafted first, which led to the overrepresentation of the poor and 
blacks.  Congress was able by conscription to raise a large military force without raising 
military pay and military wages fell more than 10% below civilian manufacturing wages. 
The potential threat of war in Europe was the reason for mobilizing the forces and the 
enactment of the peacetime draft – selective service. This resulted in a debate for those 
supporting the compulsory and volunteer system and those opposing it. On September 6, 
1940, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio stated in a national radio broadcast: 
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The draft … is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty, 
which have always been considered a part of American democracy. This 
country has always been opposed to a large standing army.61  
Those opposed to conscription cited the Bill of Rights, individual liberty and 
historical tradition. The argument was never resolved and became moot with the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, when arguments against conscription were not longer relevant. On 
December 13, 1941, all territorial restrictions on conscription were abolished. The length 
of service for the duration of the war was extended and for six months afterwards and 
eligibility was changed from 18 to 31years to 18 to 44 years of age. A year later, all men 
between 18 and 65 were required to register. Later in 1943, no volunteers were accepted 
in order to better control and organize production needs. At the end of WWII, 
conscription was incorporated into American society and citizen service obligation was 
accepted. The draft expired one and half years after the war, but because of the tense 
international situation and seeming inability to recruit enough volunteers, President 
Truman requested reenactment of the draft in 1948. At that time, there was a need for a 
larger standing army because Germany and Japan had to be occupied, a new military 
establishment in both countries had to be staffed, and mainly the communist threat of the 
Soviet Union had to be balanced. More importantly, as warfare revolved around more 
sophisticated weapons, trained personnel were required. Therefore, conscription was kept 
to address these threats and the tasks and size of the new military. 
“We have lived with the draft so long,” declared Richard M. Nixon during his 
campaign for the Presidency, “that too many of us accept it as normal and necessary.” 
This statement probably reflects the way a majority of Americans felt toward the draft as 
an institution during the late 1950s and early 1960s.62 During this time, extensive public 
dialog started and the issue of the inequity of the draft especially transformed this debate 
into one of the major issues of public concern. The Vietnam War dramatized the inequity 
of the burden bore by some members of society.  
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 The number of young men eligible for military service more than doubled 
between 1955 and 1975, so the burden of conscription was limited to a relatively small 
segment of society. Therefore, some age groups were not required to serve and a smaller 
fraction of people bore the risk of death and injury. The draft enabled the military to pay 
less than it would pay volunteers, and also less than they could earn from civilian 
employment. Another debated issue was how much the all-volunteer force would cost 
and if the taxpayers would be willing to pay it. From a socioeconomic point of view, the 
issues were that a professional military was seen as a threat to civilian authority and 
secondly, a high percentage of blacks in the military came from the lower socioeconomic 
classes. Most attention to this debate began around 1966 when the DoD conducted a 
study of the draft. Also, the American Economic Association devoted a session to the 
economics of manpower procurement.  
In 1967, two official advisory groups were established: the National Advisory 
Commission on Selective Service and the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower 
Procurement. Both group reports studied alternatives to the Selective Service System and 
both rejected the feasibility and concept of an all-volunteer force. The former report 
stated that a volunteer military was insufficiently flexible to respond to changing 
conditions, too costly, could lead to undesirable social effects such as erosion of patriotic 
spirit, racial imbalances, and possibly further isolate the military from society. The latter 
report confirmed all the major points of the first report. All public studies recommended 
the continuation of the Selective Service but there were other, unofficial reports 
suggesting an end to the draft. The report, How to End the Draft, sponsored by several 
members of the House of Representatives, stated that a volunteer military system is not 
only feasible but also desirable. Also, a conference of prominent economists and social 
scientists in Chicago in 1966 confirmed the same results in their collection of papers 
called “The Draft.”63 In 1969, after President Richard Nixon came to office, he 
announced the formation of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed 
Force.  
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The so-called Gates Commission64 consisted of a professional research staff of 
about forty and was able to provide a comprehensive review and analysis of the issues. 
The main goal of the commission was to study the costs and savings resulting from an 
all-volunteer force, as well as its social and economic implications. The commission 
researched a broad spectrum of issues and formulated answers on issues related to public 
debate. The main problems seen were the inequities of conscription, the undesirable side 
effects possible with ending the draft, and the feasibility of the volunteer force. Inequities 
from the draft received the most attention. Pay discrimination against junior military 
personnel was one of the main issues discussed in the report, which had fallen to about 
half of civilian pay by 1965. This form of discrimination was more than sufficient to 
reject the draft policy. It was the burden of being forced to serve when many of their 
peers did not bear the cost.  
The first recommendation of the commission was to increase pay for junior 
personnel to the level comparable in the civilian sector. A second very important finding 
was that this equity pay raise would be sufficient to sustain an all-volunteer military force 
of up to 2.5 million members. It meant that the volunteer force would not require a pay 
increase above that recommended for eliminating pay discrimination. A third major 
finding is connected with the feasibility of a volunteer force especially with the budgetary 
implications of the pay raise. They found that it would increase the net annual budget 
outlays by between two and three billion dollars in 1970 constant dollars. It was 
substantially less than the 1966 DOD draft study of from $4 to $17 billion. It was not a 
true economic cost, but more a matter of shifting the burden of payment from young men 
serving to the general taxpaying public. In fact, budget outlays for a volunteer force 
would likely be less than the draft because of reduced personnel turnover, and so forth. 
Also, a volunteer force would eliminate the inefficiencies of the “conscription tax”. Thus, 
more savings would be attained in true social costs and the volunteer force would be 
economically feasible. The commission rejected the argument that abolishing 
conscription would lead to a loss of civilian control, relying on 200 years of experience 
with volunteers.  
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They expected the percentage of blacks in the military to increase. After a year of 
intensive work, the commission recommended a volunteer force as a better solution for 
society and that a standby draft would be reserved only for periods of national 
emergency: 
We unanimously believe that the nation’s interests will be better served by 
an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a 
mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken 
promptly to move in this direction; and that the first indispensable step is 
to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in 
armed forces.65     
After the completion of the report and the statement of recommendations, the 
debate moved to the political environment. The actual decision about the future of the 
military was up to the Administration and Congress. The process started in 1971, when 
the Administration sponsored legislation in Congress for an increase in first term military 
pay. The legislation contained different timetables than those the commission requested. 
The Commission requested a pay raise on July 1, 1970 but according to legislation it was 
received a year later on May 1, 1971, and the requested starting date for the volunteer 
force was July 1, 1971 but legislation suggested a two-year extension of the draft to July 
1, 1973.  After the Administration and House of Representatives passed the bill, it was 
approved and implemented on November 14, 1971.  Now the military was faced with the 
problems of implementing changes that were taking place in the civilian world. A change 
in the pay policy was the most important step to ease the transition to the volunteer force. 
Before the draft was ended, policies existed which helped to make the transition much 
easier. 
An important change was the institutionalization of annual increases of military 
pay tied to private sector wage increases in 1967.  The other change was catch-up pay for 
career personnel instituted in 1968 when pay comparability was established. The reason 
was to recruit qualified personnel for the career force, which meant pay comparable to 
the civilian market. Also, pay was viewed as equal for equal rank and years of service in 
the 1950s and 1960s.  
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However, there were shortages in some highly technical enlisted specialties where 
experience, education and mental aptitude played a very important role. Proficiency pay 
was introduced to improve conditions in skill areas experiencing shortages with 
additional monthly pay. The variable reenlistment bonus was for first time re-enlistees 
and varied according to specialty. Between fiscal years 1970 and 1973, the number of 
recruiters was increased by 65% and recruiting expenditures doubled. A manpower 
policy introduced enlistment options such as the selection of job assignment, training or a 
specific unit. Assignments in Europe were used as desirable overseas tours to attract 
recruits. Integration of manpower needs with grade control and career advancement were 
personnel planning efforts to create an efficient system. The result of these efforts was an 
increase in the number of volunteers from 1970 to 1972 by more than 30% and from 
1970 to 1973 by more than 50%. Due to the inefficiencies from the time of the draft, 
attention was still paid to the volunteer force. With the end of the draft, much of the 
debate shifted to academic and military journals.  
During the two years following, the AVF was the focus of debate, and the 
recruiting progress was reported regularly. Due to a deep recession, the third year 
proceeded without any controversy and recruiting was completely successful. This lasted 
until 1976, when the debate about an all-volunteer force was renewed. The first issue was 
if the military services could attract a sufficient number of volunteers. Since the army did 
not meet quotas in the beginning, the new force was criticized but after the first two 
years, all recruiting quotas were met. The failure of the reserve forces to attract sufficient 
numbers raised questions about mobilization capabilities. When the quotas were filled, 
another question emerged about the quality of new recruits. The increasing proportion of 
blacks in the armed forces was also an issue. In 1973 about 30% of new army recruits 
were black. The last issue was the dramatic increase in the budgetary cost of the 
volunteer force. Screening criteria were used to sort out individuals not expected to do 
well on the job. This screening consisted of medical, moral, and mental examinations and 
evaluations, which were used to assess the quality of recruits. The next question was how 
to attract and recruit in sufficient quantities.  
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Quantity can be evaluated by force strength objectives. The most significant 
problem emerged in the reserve force, where quotas were not met. Reserves were 
organized in three components: the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired 
Reserve. The Ready Reserve were determined to augment active forces and consisted of 
the Selected Reserve mobilized and deployed as units and Individual Ready Reserve 
(IRR) used as individual fillers of active and reserve units. Members of the Selected 
Reserve are trained periodically and paid for training hours. The Individual Ready 
Reserve does not train regularly and members do not receive pay and usually sign on for 
six years of service upon joining the active force. After leaving active service, they finish 
the rest of those six years in the IRR or Standby Reserve. The Selected Reserve acquires 
and retains personnel directly as in the active force. Since the IRR is not trained and paid, 
it is called only in case of war or national emergency. In the evaluation, it was stated that 
the reserves had problems resulting from the draft era but generally the Selected Reserves 
appear to be no less capable than before. The theory of supply and demand was used to 
estimate the ability of the AVF to provide manpower. The main factors were tangible 
aspects of military employment, dissemination of information to potential recruits, the 
employment and earnings conditions in the civilian economy, the population base and 
taste for military service. To examine demand, questions about recruiting objectives such 
as desirable force strength, attrition or turnover and what pay increase is needed should 
be answered.  
The cost issue mostly attention attracted from opponents of the AVF. When 
defense budget passed $100 billion in the mid 1970s, it became the hot topic and 
questions about affordability started to be asked. Since the AVF was under public 
supervision and criticism, the facts were misrepresented. The first mistake was a simple 
comparison of costs in the 1970s with the costs of the 1950s and 1960s. Past estimates 
understated the true costs. Also, the manpower cost growth was increasing long before 
the AVF, but the public became aware of it in connection with the AVF. Project 
Volunteer was counted as an AVF cost, but basic military pay was increased and it was 
more politically inspired than the AVF. The Project Volunteer account also included the 
reenlistment bonus, which was instituted during the draft.  
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It included costs such as education, recreation and other costs that would have 
been undertaken whether or not the draft had been ended. Due to the manner in which the 
budget was structured, the draft enabled the military to pay less than the economic cost 
for conscripted labor. However, the budget expenditures for military manpower do not 
necessarily respect the true cost of manpower to society and in particular under the draft. 
The supply of inexpensive manpower during the draft affected practices so much so that 
efficient manpower management and utilization were secondary. This led to resource 
allocations being driven mostly by tradition rather than by real resource costs, resulting in 
substantial inefficiencies. One of the basic requirements in the AVF environment became 
resource allocation. There are many technologically efficient alternatives for achieving 
defense missions, but given the prices, there is only one combination, which is 
economically efficient. Thus, the allocation of resources became critically important 
given the amount of defense spending associated with personnel. The problem was that 
manpower costs are driven as much by the numbers and types of personnel required as by 
such personnel policies as pay, promotion policy and career management.66  
Manpower requirements generally depend on force structure, operations and 
maintenance policies, the amount and types of equipment and types of personnel used. 
One of the issues was the substitution of civilian employees for military personnel made 
on the assumption that civilians are less expensive than military personnel. Factors such 
as personnel constraints, cost-effectiveness and tradition should be used to make a very 
accurate determination of job requirements. The proper mix of experience in the force 
leads to keeping experienced as well as junior personnel. The first-term/career mix of 
enlisted forces was especially important after the draft was ended. The manpower 
management policy was changed with the new conditions of the AVF. The first principle 
of change concerned equity versus efficiency, which resulted in a second-best approach. 
Equity concerns were based on the perception that military pay was lower than civilian 
wages. Thus, the policy “to treat everybody fairly” became embodied in the 
compensation system.  
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Personnel with the same rank and years of service had the same pay, even if the 
person was the base commander with responsibilities while the second person was a staff 
officer with no responsibilities. Since no efficient management existed, the military was 
forced to rely on less desirable ways of achieving the objectives required fulfilling the 
defense mission. The second principle was to maintain a youthful force, relying on 
plentiful and inexpensive first-termers whenever possible and use experienced personnel 
in supervisory positions.  The third principle was the management of manpower done 
through the “course of least resistance.” There was no particular strategy because no 
matter what quality standards were imposed there was always a sufficient supply of 
manpower. The size of the workforce encouraged approaches to the promotion policy 
that were as easy and simple as possible to monitor and administer. Administrative 
simplicity became the most important principle of the manpower management 
philosophy. The most significant changes affected recruiting when the draft was ended. 
During the draft recruiters played a passive role in the flow of enlisted personnel into the 
military. This was in contrast to the new, more active role of recruiters in searching for 
prospective enlistees. 
There were two main concerns in recruiting activities under the new conditions. 
The services had to define the role of recruiting. That role was not only to attract people 
to seek employment in the military, but also to classify the aptitude of enlistees towards 
military service, selecting them and determining where the enlistees ought to be assigned 
in the military. All these factors during the draft operated mostly independently, but the 
AVF environment increased their interdependence. The new job of the recruiter was to 
act as recruiter, classifier, selector and assigner in one person. The selection process was 
the primary role for the AVF. Specific standards and strategies had to be developed to 
screen out unacceptable candidates. Military training is an essential part of the military 
and became one of the most important issues in defense manpower. Congress is involved 
in the monitoring and authorization of military training. Two groups of problems were 
discussed after the draft was ended: training strategies and training methods. Training 
became enormously expensive. Approximately 20% of all military personnel were 
involved in training activities.  
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The military training establishment is sized by a number of factors: breadth and 
scope of military training, numbers of personnel trained each year, and size of the 
training support establishment. The first factor depends on the military requirements for 
manpower usually trained in-house in a wide variety of jobs. The second factor depends 
upon the need for the initial skill of the recruit and skill progression training. The third 
factor is the large training support establishment, which is the most visible issue in 
military training. The largest element, almost two thirds of the total, was the initial skill 
training for enlisted personnel. The extent and cost of first-termer training depends on the 
number of personnel receiving training and the amount each individual receives. The key 
issue is how the military can increase the return from training relative to the investment 
in it, rather than focusing on the size of the training effort. 
After individuals are trained and ready for their duty assignment, the problem of 
effective management and use of personnel arises. At this time, career management plays 
a role with monetary and non-monetary tools and policies. The most important factors 
discussed were career length, promotion policy and rotation. The regular length of a 
career after WWII had been 20 years. When shorter careers are possible, the military 
loses its most productive members. In comparison with the historical norm of a 30-year 
career, it led to higher accession requirements and greater training costs. No retirement 
vesting before the 20 year point is cited as a reason for losing qualified personnel at the 
end of initial obligation especially for people who do not want to stay in the service for 
20 years. With promotion and pay tied to years of service, the system placed a premium 
on age instead of performance and capability. This limits the opportunities of young, 
bright and capable officers and encouraged them to leave the service. The promotion 
policy of “up-or-out” requires reaching the highest grade within a specific period of time 
or else be forced out of the service. On the one hand, some personnel do not wish to have 
supervisory responsibilities. On the other hand, the policy is forcing out less desirable 
personnel. In the U.S. case, the rotation of forces is a very important issue because of the 
units and bases spread throughout the world. The military compensation system is the 
most important policy instrument for the procurement and retention of personnel for the 
Armed Forces.  
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As stated, the main reason was to keep the military competitive with the civil 
sector. The main part of the military package was pay and retirement. Military pay is a 
function of how much is needed to attract and retain the numbers and types of personnel 
desired and how military pay should be measured. After basic military pay, military 
retirement is the second largest component of the military compensation system. People 
leaving the service before the completion of 20 years do not receive any retirement 
benefits. After reaching 20 years, the benefits are 2.5% times the years of service 
completed (max 75 percent) times annual basic military pay at the time of retirement. 
Retirement is a part of the compensation system and it is very important to provide 
personnel with the system so as to attract and retain enough personnel to fulfill defense 
missions. The establishment of the AVF was the largest public policy initiative of the 
U.S. defense establishment.  
B. BRITAIN 
The most experienced volunteer forces with a long tradition in Europe have been 
the British Armed Forces. Britain had a small army back in the 18th century. By 1802, 
military force strength was 151,000 men. At this time, the army was isolated from 
society. During the years 1859 through 1879, wars occurred in Europe involving all the 
major powers. This was an experience about the size, organization and structure of 
armies and usually peacetime forces ready for war. A large army with short-service 
conscripts was undesirable because of the long-term control of the empire. There was 
also a fear of putting arms into hands of unreliable troops. Nevertheless, there was no 
tradition of conscription and misgivings existed concerning a large standing (permanent) 
army.  
Already, during this time, they tried to improve the quality of the army by making 
the military a respectable profession and improving pay and the conditions of service. In 
1870, the government issued the Army Enlistment Act. The length of service was 
reduced from twenty to twelve years. Usually, half of this time was spent in a reserve 
status after leaving active service. The territorial force succeeded the volunteer force in 
1908 and became the Territorial Army in 1920. In 1916, it became apparent that 
volunteers could not fill the requirement of 1.5 million men.  
45 
The shortage was solved by the implementation of conscription initially only for 
unmarried men. During the years 1918 and 1919, after recognizing that a large army was 
not needed, demobilization was accomplished. In 1920, army strength was reduced to the 
pre-war level. The economy and imperialism did not lead Britain to extend conscription 
in peacetime. The island environment guided Britain in the 1930s to concentrate on 
building ships and bombers. Only a small expeditionary army was prepared in case of 
problems. In 1938, Britain continued the policy of Home and Imperial defense without 
cooperation with other countries.  
On September 3, 1939, the National Service Act was issued as a first peacetime 
conscription act. An Army smaller in strength played a lesser role in WWII than in WWI. 
More emphasis was placed on the Royal Air Force, antiaircraft weapons and 
administrative manpower was increased. After the lesson of WWII, the Britain deployed 
forces to the Continent. This time, Britain continued with conscription, which enabled her 
to not only strengthen Europe but also cut military spending. The National Service Act of 
1948 stated that 18 years old men are eligible for enlistment for 12 months with part time 
service in the years following after service. In 1950, at the beginning of the Korean crisis, 
the length of service was extended from 18 months to two years. During the 1950s, the 
British Army was suffering from having to face heavy commitments under limited 
resources due to its roles on the Continent and traditional imperial peacekeeping. In the 
1950s, the pattern of the Cold War became more apparent, and by 1955 had become 
institutionalized, with the Warsaw Pact balancing NATO. In order to afford some 
improvements in equipment, it had to somewhat reduce forces in 1955.  
Severe economic limits were visible during the Suez operation in 1956.67 Under 
these conditions, the need for change was evident. In the same year, the new Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, appointed Duncan Sandys as a Minister of Defense with 
instructions to create a sound but economic defense policy. Parliament was told that he 
would have the authority to make decisions on all matters of policy affecting the size, 
shape, organization, and disposition of the Armed Forces, their equipment and supply, 
pay and conditions of service.  
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The new government was expecting Sandys to cut defense spending substantially 
and he wanted to challenge every function of the military forces. On the organizational 
level, the changes included the restructuring of the defense decision-making process, 
while the changes largely led to the termination of National Service, a reduction in 
conventional armaments, greater declaratory emphasis on Britain’s expanding nuclear 
deterrent and an emphasis on the independence of that deterrence.68 Sandys published a 
defense review in 1957 called the Defense White Paper. A statement announced the 
creation of a deterring nuclear force resulting in savings in conventional forces. In this 
situation, it was possible to rebuild forces that were smaller and professional. This not 
only solved the economic problems but also addressed strategic reasons. The relationship 
between the Minister and Service Chiefs was highly strained especially in debates about 
the planned size of the armed forces when economic savings were stressed without 
strategic concepts.  
By 1962, the armed forces were to be reduced from 690,000 to 375,000 men and 
conscription abolished. From the standpoint of manpower savings, the administration had 
to be civilianized as much as possible. After 1960, Britain was the only European country 
with a citizen army. The army experienced an identity crisis concerning its self-
consciousness about a service lifestyle and doubts about the opportunities for a second 
career. Some people felt that the decision to end conscription reflected electoral rather 
than strategic or economic considerations. Britain had experienced recruitment problems 
for an all-volunteer force. The reasons were low birth rates in the 1950s, the tendency for 
boys to stay in school longer and a demand for higher education, increased competition in 
the labor market and better training opportunities in the civilian sector. Recruitment in the 
free market on which the services had to rely posed difficult problems. In a period when 
full employment remained a government policy, the ability of the services to outbid 
civilian recruiters was highly limited, and often had to be related to non-material 
inducements such as patriotism, excitement and adventure.  
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The new government from 1964 on began to shift towards a more coherent 
headquarters structure and an all-volunteer long-service military profession. In 1968, the 
Defense White Paper, in order to fight the aforementioned problems, announced intended 
improvements in fringe benefits and living conditions. Later in 1969, a new pay structure 
was announced which was fully comparable to the civilian sector. The X-factor was 
created which compensated for extra disadvantages of service life such as frequent 
moves. Since 1972, the non-commissioned ranks can enlist for three to 22 years of 
service with the freedom of choice on length and terms of service. This flexible option 
should have aided recruitment but manpower shortages continued during the 1970s. 
Recruiting started to improve from 1979 onward after the pay award was implemented.69 
Pay, pension and conditions as well as good equipment; resettlement; training and 
education to standards recognizable by civilian institutions all made the new 
professionalism work, but at a cost which emphasized that security, such as health, 
welfare and education, was a public good that was extremely difficult to ration or 
restrain.70  
Professionalization and the military salary were undoubtedly effective instruments 
in changing the level of skills and the self-regard of the military cadres in the long term.  
Today’s pay of civilians and service personnel is subject to the government’s public 
sector pay policy where increases in remuneration have to be offset by departmental 
efficiency savings. There is no direct linkage or comparability between civilian and 
service pay levels. The Armed Forces Pay Review Board and the Senior Salaries Review 
Board are recommending pay levels that are broadly comparable to equivalent civilian 
jobs while recognizing that comparability is an elusive concept and involves judgment 
calls. Non-commissioned officers can serve in a short-term contract for three to five years 
or open-ended service with a release notice period of up to 18 months. Their career 
finishes after 22 years of service when it is virtually mandatory to leave.  
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British officers have a three-stage career pattern with an initial engagement of 9 to 
12 years depending on the service, medium-term engagement to17 years or about age 40 
and a full career to age 55. Rank is a major determinant of retirement. General officers 
can serve past age 55 but follow an “up or out “ pattern. Promotions in the British Armed 
Forces are based on merit, performance, experience, training, and the achievements of 
certain qualifications or skills. Each service has its own personnel system based on 
manning and funding provided by the Ministry of Defense central staff. Education is 
usually obtained from a civilian college or university before entering the military and 
non-degree military colleges provide individual training.    
C. FRANCE 
Conscription in France was first introduced during the French Revolution. 
Universal service dates back to 1905, when the drawing from lots to designate conscripts 
was abolished. The law established that compulsory military service for all young men 
would be equal. It was viewed more as a patriotic duty to serve country. The length of 
military service was gradually reduced and later the civilian national service was created 
and introduced. When compared to other Western European countries, France has not 
fully participated in the military organization of NATO since 1966 when President 
Charles de Gaulle withdrew forces from NATO’s integrated military structure.71 Its 
participation focuses mainly on NATO political committees. Like Britain, France is a 
colonial power with a long tradition of sending troops abroad. France had no shortage of 
manpower and through conscription had an excess of human resources. The country also 
does not import strategic missiles from the United States as does Britain and it has always 
insisted on national independence in the development of nuclear power. France describes 
the use of the air-launched nuclear weapons as a “final warning.” Since the end of the 
Cold War, France started to orientate itself towards European unification and was 
involved in the development of the European Security and Defense Identity. By 1990, 
France was still using the conscription system and that year a report estimated that the 
availability of 20-year-old men will far exceed requirements until 2005.  
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France’s new goals were shaped according to the experience of the Gulf War 
from 1990 to 1991. Their forces suffered from a lack of modern equipment and a poor 
integration of conscripts. Military forces were dependent on other countries, especially 
the United States, for logistics and intelligence. It was a hard lesson for France and her 
forces with the Gaullist policy of self-reliance in defense.72 The lesson of the Gulf War 
and the new conditions facing Europe after the end of the Cold War forced France to 
better define new defense requirements and seek efficient solutions. The new policy of 
French leaders was to increase involvement in the transatlantic Alliance and to stress 
European integration. The rationale of large standing armies disappeared with the 
collapse of communism and the Soviet Union.  
Other factors considered are budgetary constraints and new missions and roles. 
France is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council and heavily involved in 
peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. There was no reason to continue the 
conscription system that relied on not very well-trained and underpaid conscripts. 
Realities changed rapidly and the Gaullist approaches did not fit the new post Cold War 
world. France was looking for forces, which were highly mobile, technologically 
advanced and quick in crisis response. The UK model of a volunteer force was closely 
studied in Paris. The traditional emphasis was on nuclear deterrence with a reinforced 
European defense commitment. French military planners focused on a higher quality 
professional force able to send more soldiers on intervention missions. All these 
aforementioned conditions led to announcement of President Chirac to move to a fully 
professional armed forces.73 According to a report, it was decided to reform forces during 
1997 to 2002 by phasing out conscription, creating more compact forces and reorganizing 
reserve and active forces. This started the most radical transformation of France’s defense 
policy. Also, the public supported this change when, in opinion polls, 70% of the 
respondents favored an end to conscription. A complete reorganization of forces was to 
be completed by 2015 with an entire new generation of systems.  
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The goal of the restructuring of the forces was a reduction in personnel from 
577,000 in 1996 to 434,000 in 2002 resulting in a savings of $3 billion. Also, 40 
regiments and five command centers of the army, six air bases and two navy bases were 
closed. The reserves were the most affected by these radical reforms. Restructuring the 
reserve force created two types of reserve forces: operational reserve and citizen’s 
reserve. The operational reserve will number no more than 100,000 men and women on a 
voluntary basis. They will be fully integrated with regular forces and will provide them 
operational back up. In 1998, approximately 430,000 men were trained and able to be 
mobilized in the reserves. This force was reduced and the new reserve force underwent 
refresher training. French law introduced the “route to citizenship” in October 1997 
which was built into three stages: compulsory education in the principles and 
organization of defense in France as part of the school curriculum, compulsory 
registration and participation of young French nationals in a “day of introduction to 
defense and the French armed forces”.  
This law should ensure the participation of citizens in the nation’s defense and a 
military connection with the civilian community. After this compulsory event, young 
people can decide on voluntary civilian or military service, join the armed forces or 
reserves, or undergo military training. Girls also became a part of the program with the 
same choices as boys in April 2000. The Citizen’s reserve ensures a connection between 
the nation and the armed forces and their dedication to defense. The government tried to 
secure social and economic support for local communities faced with closures and 
unemployment. Redundant military barracks and facilities were converted to civilian use. 
To encourage public support for the reforms, the Ministry of Defense implemented an 
active policy of public information, recruitment, training and redeployment and retraining 
for civilian life. In strategic areas, forces have to fulfill the following four functions: 
deterrence, prevention, projection and protection.74 Deterrence is a traditional element of 
French defense based on its nuclear capabilities. Prevention is playing an essential role 
after the conflicts in the Balkans and Kosovo. The main idea is to prevent potential 
conflicts by all political and military means and actions.  
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Projection became a new priority and France is now ready to deploy more than 
50,000 men outside French territory. Protection is connected with home defense when 
forces are deployed or involved in an international crisis so as to prevent reprisals at 
home. Dividing a country into new military zones makes it possible to optimize military 
assets. On an international scale, Africa is a priority for France’s actions abroad to be 
provided by cooperation arrangements and modernization and through initiatives for 
preventing and dealing with any crises. Upon reflecting on the Kosovo crisis, emphasis 
will be placed on improving intelligence and projection and transport capabilities.  
It is the first time that President Chirac has left the longstanding Gaullist policy of 
self-sufficiency in weapon manufacturing. It is particularly in the field of satellite 
intelligence, command, control and communications equipment, and strategic lift where 
manufacturing is weak or nonexistent. France is also heavily involved in the building of 
European defense structures and strengthening its position in them. French traditional 
conscription ended on November 30, 2001 when the last group of conscripts left the 
forces after six months of service. This year France intended to recruit 10,500 people but 
is slightly behind this intention to attract suitable candidates. Presently, the MoD employs 
80,000 civilians but that number should increase to cover the jobs previously performed 
by conscripts. 
D. SPAIN AND ITALY 
Spain has a 230 years long history of conscription from the time Carlos III 
introduced conscription in 1770. After the death of General Franco in 1975, a democratic 
transition has been occurring in Spain with the new President Adolfo Suarez. During his 
presidency, the Ministry of Defense was established on July 4, 1977, as well as the 
government role as a director and executor of defense policy. However, the real basis for 
the military organization was established in 1980. On May 30, 1982, Spain became the 
16th member of NATO with the hope that it will help to control and professionalize the 
military.75 The constitution in 1987 stated that citizens have the right and duty to defend 
Spain.  
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Under a 1991 law, all Spanish men were required to register for military service at 
the age of 17. They were supposed to serve at age 18 but usually were called up the year 
they turned 19. This law approved the mixed model of military service for men and 
women and conscripts with a possibility of volunteering. In 1996, President Aznar 
announced his decision to complete the professionalization of the armed forces.76 
Recently, there was increased public debate about conscription and it was a key factor in 
the professionalization process. Spanish society is favorably inclined towards 
professional forces and a better image for the armed forces. In 1999, a law was 
introduced about the creation of professional armed forces. This law was supposed to 
suspend conscription by December 31, 2002, but not abolish it. Compulsory military 
service ended in 2001 with the last call for conscripts. Women and men have an equal 
chance of joining the professional armed forces beginning on 1 January 2002 when they 
become 17 years old. Women already represent 2.3% of the country’s armed forces. The 
same law also established a system of mobilization with reserve forces forming the 
essential part of an all-volunteer force.  
There is a voluntary reserve system and a compulsory reserve, which is called up 
when national defense demands it. Lately, there were several reports about problems that 
Spain has with recruiting requirements. Due to the booming economic expansion of the 
country and military salaries being way below those in the civilian sector, recruiting is a 
challenge. Also, there is one more condition, which will affect recruitment. It is the 
demographic trend, which was estimated to decrease by 40% from 1996 to 2006. The 
transformation of forces requires that about 25,000 be recruited every year. The Cabinet 
changed the limitations, which prevented female volunteers from joining the special 
operations unit, the airborne brigade and the Spanish Legion. Women are already in the 
training process of joining units. An effort is being made to fill the personnel 
requirements, which is somewhere between 102,000 to 120,000. In order to get closer to 
this number, the maximum age for joining the armed forces was raised from 26 to 28.  
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The other area of recruitment to be improved was the lowering of the minimum 
Intelligence Quotient requirements from 90 to 70 and applicants will not need to have 
completed a secondary-level education. It was also announced that Spain is going to 
recruit 2,000 foreign nationals annually to cover the shortfall in recruiting.77 All these 
measures were an attempt to obtain enough volunteers and speed up or shorten the 
process of professionalization. These recruits are expected to be from Latin America 
where the language and cultural are similar.  The change announced later was that instead 
of the end of 2002, the armed forces would like to end conscription at the end of 2001.   
Italy is in the same position as Spain. It is in the process of transitioning to a 
professional force. The law, which will abolish conscription, was also introduced in1999. 
In Italy, it will be accomplished in two stages. In the first stage, the number of regular 
soldiers will be increased to 42,000 men over three years while conscription will be 
phased out and the service will be open to women. The second phase ends in 2006 and 
will reduce forces from about 270,000 to 190,000.78 The Constitution states that 
conscription can be restored immediately in the case of a crisis or war. 
Italy, following the new European trend, is adapting the country’s military to the 
new requirements of a country in Europe and NATO. It was assumed that there would be 
no shortage of recruits since 32% of those unemployed are under the age of 25 and it will 
be the only chance for them to find a job.79  An all-volunteer force will mean higher 
salaries, improved training and better equipment for the Italian military. Defense 
spending is expected to rise by 50% in the next few years. Conscription should be 
abolished at the beginning of the year 2003. The first women officer cadets have recently 
signed up and by 2002 women can volunteer for every sector in the armed forces. 
Communists in the government argue that conscription ensured that the military was 
linked to the people.  
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It was announced that Italy is also considering recruiting foreign nationals to 
overcome a shortage in manpower.80 The decline in the population is making recruitment 
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V. CZECH ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION - NOT AN 
ALTERNATIVE BUT A CHOICE  
Membership in NATO has changed military concepts and strategies for the Czech 
Armed Forces and produced new requirements. The NATO security environment 
diminished threats with collective defense playing an important role in the democratic 
development of the country. It has changed the geographic perspective of European 
politics and views on defense. It also brought up the question of our effective 
participation and commitment to the defense of our allies. The importance of directly 
defending the territory of the Czech Republic decreased, and the significance of common 
defense interests increased. Also, the new security environment diminished the need for 
large standing armies and large military expenditures.  
The other related event was the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Paris 
1990,81 which limits the maximum number of forces and conventional armaments. Thus, 
military conflict in Europe is very unlikely. However, operations and interventions such 
as in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans or Kosovo are more likely. These operations 
demonstrated the need for modern, well trained and equipped, highly mobile and 
professional forces. Aside from the defense of the Czech territory and NATO, member 
states operating in local conflicts outside of the NATO arena have become the most 
important mission. Rescue, humanitarian and peace operations are important. Operations 
are occurring more often and there is an increased need for professional soldiers.  
A. POLITICAL CONDITIONS  
Since the 1996 elections, the Czech political climate has been unstable and has 
been affected by the worsened state of the economy, the collapse of banks and public 
doubts about the merits of the privatization program. Increasing social problems resulted 
in labor unrest and strikes in 1996 and early 1997.82 In two years, the second Klaus 
minority cabinet and Czech politics, in general, suffered a severe loss to their prestige.  
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This was caused by a number of scandals involving the intelligence service, the 
collapse of the Kreditní Banka (Credit Bank)83, the loss of NATO documents84, the 
wrongful use of academic titles by members of parliament, and party funding of the 
ODS85(Civic Democratic Party) and ODA86 (Civic Democratic Alliance). Politics are 
conducted in an atmosphere of suspicion and accusation. During the election campaign, 
the CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) was accused of receiving illegal foreign aid, a 
charge that has been proven to be false. As a result, politics in general have a bad 
reputation, which is worsened by the many intra party struggles. The communist party 
and the extreme right republicans strongly opposed the coalition and made their position 
very difficult. This gave the CSSD an important role in politics.  
The health of President Havel is a constant source of speculation and he is 
accused of confusing his role as a former dissident with the political neutrality of the 
head of state. It is believed that he has a position far stronger than the Constitution 
intends, thanks to his past and his continuing debates in the media. His popularity lately 
has fallen. However, crime is as much a problem in the Czech Republic as in neighboring 
countries. The human rights situation in the Czech Republic is generally favorable. One 
problem is discrimination against the Roma minority both by the population and by state 
officials. Many Roma prefer to leave the country when an opportunity arises. Rumors 
about easy entrance requirements initiated a mass exodus of Roma citizens to Great 
Britain and Canada. Most families were sent back, and in some cases, entrance visas were 
required for all Czech citizens due to these circumstances. The plan of the mayor of Ústí 
nad Labem to build a wall around a Romani housing block in June 1998 caused 
international outrage.87  
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The remaining German minority in the Sudetenland sparks discussion when 
demands are made for the return of pre-1948 property.88 The 1991 Lustration Law89, 
which excluded former police agents and high communist officials from public office, 
was extended in 1996 to the year 2000 and continues to stir debate. The Zeman cabinet 
had to deal with the reform of the pension system as a result of the increasing number of 
pensioners, and was supposed to find a solution to the imperfect legal framework and 
unclear ownership relations surrounding the privatization process. In January 1996, the 
Czech Republic turned in an official application for membership in the European 
Union.90  
In December of the following year, the European Council in Luxembourg, 
following the recommendation of the European Commission, decided to start the 
intergovernmental conference on the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. 
Enlargement talks are continuing, and in 2003, the Czech Republic should be ready for 
EU membership, which is the earliest unofficially announced accession date. The 
President of the Czech Republic is Mr. Václav Havel91, elected in February 1993 and 
again in January 1998 for a five-year term. Prime Minister Miloš Zeman led the minority 
centre-left Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which had a formal cooperation 
agreement, called the Opposition Pact, with the conservative Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) and his leader and previous Prime Minister Václav Klaus.92 Nevertheless, these 
figures and parties expressed support for the reform of the armed forces. Only the 
Communist Party opposed this reform as well as NATO accession. The government 
managed economic reform by adopting Euro-centrist, anti-corruption and business-
friendly measures, including the privatization of many state-owned monopolies, to 
accelerate Czech readiness for membership in the European Union.  
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Czech households experienced a significant fall in their standard of living and 
inequality and poverty increased with the transition to a free market. Not surprisingly, the 
popularity of Zeman’s government decreased, and Zeman resigned as Chairman of the 
CSSD in April 2001.93 Until the next parliamentary elections in June 2002, Zeman will 
retain the position of Prime Minister “at the request of the party.” The outcome of the 
next election remains uncertain, because the CSSD, the ODS and the centre-right Quad 
Coalition have almost the same positions. On the political scene, reform of the armed 
forces is perceived as a fundamental change needed to create an effective defense system. 
Until NATO accession, the armed forces did not attract political interest. 
Professionalization is one of the issues on which all parties are trying to show their 
creativity before the June elections. The latest competition between the parties to make a 
good impression before elections concerns a proposition to reduce the length of 
conscription before conscription is phased out. From a political aspect, professional 
armed forces could increase their prestige as a result of complying with increasing NATO 
commitments. 
B. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
In January 1991, a complex privatization program prepared and launched by then 
Minister of Finance, Václav Klaus, was adopted by the Czechoslovak parliament.94 
Citizens were allowed to buy vouchers at a very low price. These vouchers were later 
converted into shares. This voucher system neared completion in 1995. Contrary to the 
original idea to let the population profit from privatization, a large number of vouchers, 
about 70%, fell into the hands of large investment funds. A number of these funds have 
been run by major state-owned banks, such as the KB (Commercial Bank), the CS (Czech 
Savings) and the CSOB (Czechoslovak Business Bank). The Czech Republic was 
originally considered the leader of Central Europe's transition economies. Due to 
increasing economic problems in the past several years, this view has changed. During 
the second Klaus cabinet, installed in mid 1996, both the budget deficit and trade deficit 
increased.  
                                                 
93 http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=469890, Zeman odjel, přesto je členem vedení, In spite 
that Zeman left he is still in party leadership, MF Dnes, 04/09/01, p. 2. 
94 http://www.ncpa.org/pd/pdint54.html, Czech Republic A Market Success, NCPA Policy.  
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Problems occurred in the capital markets and a large number of banks collapsed. 
A currency crisis started in May 1996 and caused economic growth to fall from 3.9% in 
1996 to 1% in 1997.95 The Klaus government's shock therapy proved to be less 
successful than expected. Despite mass privatization, fundamental reforms of many 
unsuccessful companies have not taken place. According to analysts, the Czech Republic 
has been less successful than Hungary and Poland in restructuring its economic 
institutions and enterprises. Political and financial crises in 1997 shattered the Czech 
Republic's image as one of the most stable and prosperous post-Communist states. The 
growing current account imbalance reflected a surge in domestic demand and poor export 
performance, as wage increases outpaced productivity. The government was forced to 
introduce two austerity packages96 later in the spring, which cut government spending by 
2.5% of the GDP. A tough 1998 budget continued the painful medicine. These problems 
were compounded in the summer of 1997 by an unprecedented flood, which inundated 
much of the eastern part of the country.  
Czech difficulties in 1997 contrasted with earlier periods of strong GDP growth, 
and balanced budgets, with inflation and unemployment that were among the lowest in 
the region. The consequences were the devaluation of the Czech Crown and the fall of the 
cabinet. In December 1997 the interim government of Prime Minister Tošovský adopted 
a fast-track plan to privatize banks.97 This step raised doubts about the success of the 
privatization program, due to unclear ownership relations and the imperfect legal 
framework surrounding privatization. Tošovský’s government also made plans for the 
privatization of the energy distribution companies and up to 35% of the Czech railways. 
About 80% of the Czech economy is now in private hands or partially privatized. 
However, furthering the privatization process was postponed until Zeman’s new cabinet 
had been in place for some time. Real GDP growth for 1998 was predicted to be an 
average of 1.8%.  
                                                 
95 http://www.yahooligans.com/reference/factbook/ez/econom.html, World Factbook: Czech Republic 
Economy.  
96 http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num2/constitutionwatch/czech.html, Constitution Watch, East 
Europeans Constitutional Review, Spring/Summer 1997. 
97 http://www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/dec97/pg5box.htm, Box: Czech Capital Market 
Control--To Be Announced Later, Transition Newsletter. 
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In industry, motor vehicles and parts of the food industry are performing well 
against light industry, which faces many problems. Inflation was predicted to stay 
relatively high (10%). The Czech National Bank has set as its goal a decrease in net 
inflation from 10% to 5.5 - 6.5% by the end of 1998. During the transition period, the 
social situation received little attention. Housing construction dropped considerably. The 
introduction of market principles has led to private ownership relations, differentiated 
land prices, but also to further neglecting the environment. In January 1996, the 
government set the minimum monthly wage at US$ 81, equivalent to 27% of the average 
wage. At this time, the main social-economic issues are poor health care and the 
organization of the welfare system. The retirement age has been increased gradually and 
is projected to reach 62 for men and 57 to 61 for women in 2007.  
The Czech Republic is comparatively well developed, with large rail, road and 
telephone networks and rapidly growing use of the Internet. The literacy rate is 99%. A 
large portion of the population is highly skilled. The industries of the Czech Republic are 
varied and reflect a long industrial tradition. Agriculture, industry and services are 4%, 
43% and 53% of the GDP respectively. Since 1989, industrial and agricultural output has 
declined sharply because of a fundamental lack of industrial restructuring. The foremost 
trading partners at this moment are Germany and Austria, although a large share of 
exports is directed towards Poland and Italy. Over 60% of trade is with the EU. The basic 
value-added, tax rate is 22 percent, but there are some exceptions such as most food, 
medicine and services. At the beginning of 1998, the VAT on gas and fuel was increased 
to 22%, while corporate tax was reduced from 39% to 35%. Tošovský’s government 
intended to increase gas tariffs and rents by 27% and electricity by 24% in order to 
progress towards market prices, but Zeman’s cabinet is expected to perhaps slow down 
the pace of increasing prices. The Czech economy experienced a recession during 1998-
99. It continues to show positive trends, with a GDP growth rate of 3.1% for 2000 and 
3.8% in 2001.98   
 
                                                 
98 http://www.worldinformation.com/World/Europe_EU/continent.asp?p=3&country=Europa, Eastern 
Europe. 
61 
Unemployment in 2000 averaged 8.5%, and 8.7% in 2001. Inflation in 2000 was 
3.9% and 4.7% in 2001.99 The monetary policy continues to be prudent and average 
inflation is expected to be within 4.5 to 4.9% the next few years as price liberalization 
proceeds. Banks forecast that low inflation would translate into lower interest rates and 
less income for the country's financial institutions. Personal consumption and investment 
are projected to grow significantly. So far, GDP growth has been relatively immune to 
the slowdown in the EU, but lower demand from Germany, the largest buyer of Czech 
exports, is expected to curtail growth in 2002. Attracting foreign investment to increase 
the flow of capital and expertise in the country’s leading companies is a government 
priority in order to boost economic growth.  
Basically one of the most stable and prosperous of the post-Communist states, the 
Czech Republic has been recovering from a recession since mid-1999. Growth is led by 
exports to the EU, especially Germany, and foreign investment, while domestic demand 
is reviving. Uncomfortably high fiscal and current account deficits could be future 
problems. The EU put the Czech Republic just behind Poland and Hungary in readiness 
for accession, which will give further impetus and direction to structural reform. Moves 
to complete banking, telecommunications and energy privatization will add to foreign 
investment, while intensified restructuring among large enterprises and banks and 
improvements in the financial sector should strengthen output growth. The Czech 
economy's transition problems continue to stem from too much direct and indirect 
government influence on the privatized economy, sometimes ineffective management of 
privatized firms, and a shortage of experienced financial analysts for the banking system. 
From an economic point of view, the creation of professional armed forces should result 
in minimal or no increase in higher personal expenses. In 1997, personnel costs were 
50.4% of Czech military budget while the NATO average is about 58%. Reform success 
depends on financial resources available for recruiting and retaining military personnel.  
 
                                                 
99 http://www.czso.cz/eng/news/infrate.htm, Inflation rate 1994 – 2001, Publications of the CZSO, 
Czech Statistical Office, 2001. 
62 
Reform plans are based on the preservation of the Ministry of Defense budget of 
2.2% of the Gross Domestic Product until year 2010.100 The limit of 2.0% of the GDP 
was established and agreed at the NATO accession talks. 
 
 
Czech Republic 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000     2001 latest 
Real GDP growth rate,  % 4.3 -0.8 -1.2 -0.4 2.9 4.0 Jan-Jun 
Inflation rate-annual average,  % 9.1 8.0 9.7 1.8 3.9 4.7 September 
Unemployment rate, end-year - ILO 
definition,    % 3.9 4.8 6.5 8.7 8.8 8.5 September 
General government budget balance, 
% of GDP -1.7 -2.7 -3.8 -4.0 -4.2  
Current account balance, % of GDP -7.5 -6.1 -2.4 -2.9 -4.8  
Foreign debt  
• debt export ratio, % 3.2 2.5 4.1 7.4 9.9  
Foreign direct investment in flow  
• balance of payments data, % of 
GDP 2.5 2.5 6.6 11.6 9.0  
 
Table 2.   Main Economic Trends. 
 
C. SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
After the Cold War, the Czech Republic started to create a democratic system. 
The most important goal was a functioning system of democratic and civilian control. 
There is a historically poor relationship between society and the armed forces, due to the 
occupation of the country by Germans at the beginning of WWII and the occupation by 
Warsaw Pact forces in 1968.  
There was no response from the military. They were kept in their barracks as a 
result of government decisions. Therefore, it is hard to improve the public image of the 
Czech military.  
                                                 





Attitudes of Czech Conscripts about the Army and 
Defense,% 
1992 1995 1998 
The sovereignty of the state must be protected in any case 
  
92 64 81 
Defense expenditures are an unnecessary burden for the 
state budget 
57 43 50 
If something happens to the state there is no possibility for 
an effective defense 
74 41 60 
It is useless to think about the defense of the state. The 
major powers will decide the fate of a small country such as ours. 
51 43 57 
Our army is well trained in operating combat machines 
 
25 30 33 
The population supports our army 
 
14 15 23 
Our army has a high morale 
 
12 13 16 
 
Table 3.   Attitudes of Czech Conscripts. 
From: S.Sarvaš, Informace z výzkumu č.67, HPÚ MO ČR, Praha 1999. 
 
Also, local authorities are changing attitudes toward military garrisons. Some 
people have tried to demand the closure of military barracks. Lately, local people 
recognized that garrisons or barracks could make positive contributions to the region 
through the creation of jobs, taxes, infrastructure and so forth. People also remember the 
floods in 1997-1998 when nobody helped them as did the military.101 Help is also 
provided abroad in the form of a military hospital after the earthquake in Turkey in 
1999.102 The Armed Forces are slowly restoring their reputation by performing extremely 
well in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. Also, NATO accession revived interest 
in military problems. The public is more aware of the burden of defense spending and 
more willing to bear it. People are more interested in the European Union, and the 
conditions required for accession. EU accession will affect the lives of more people with 
the creation of conditions required from this organization. The population is not diverse.  
                                                 
101 http://www.army.cz/vti/atm/atm897/povoden.htm, Jan Tůma, Vojáci a technika živlu nepodlehli, 
Soldiers and military equipment didn’t come under natural calamity. 
102 http://www.army.cz/zpravy/cesky/2000/listopad/6s.htm, Jan Procházka, Lékaři a sestry ze 6. Polní 
nemocnice vyznamenáni, Doctors and nurses from 6th military field hospital awarded, 11/24/00. 
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The major ethnic groups are the Czechs and the Slovaks each representing 94% 
and 3% of the population respectively. The Poles represent 0.6%, the Germans 0.5%, the 
Silesians 0.4%, the Romanies 0.3%, although of an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 
Romanies in the Czech Republic, only 32,903 claimed Romani nationality so the actual 
percentage is much higher, the Hungarians 0.2% and others 1% of the population.103 
Minorities are usually from neighboring countries. The professional armed forces will 
benefited from the prestige of the military, and young people looking for a job will have 
more opportunities from which to choose. Law will be more respected which young 
people tried to circumvent by avoiding forced compulsory military service. One of the 
main issues is the decreasing demographic trend of population in the Czech Republic.  
 




































































































































Figure 1.   Male Population of Eighteen Year Olds in 1993-2018. 
Source: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/prilohy.htm, Documents on the 
preparation of theCRarmed Forces Reform – Annexes. 
 
                                                 
103 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/, EU Enlargement - Country Profile. 
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Demographic trends together with the increasing number of young people asking 
for civilian service instead of compulsory military service is making it difficult to fulfill 
the needed number of conscripts.  
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Figure 2.   Civil Service in 1993-2000. 
From: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/prilohy.htm, Documents on the 
Preparation of the CR Armed Forces Reform – Annexes. 
 
Also, housing conditions are not good. Many people commute because of the lack of 
military housing. As there are no prospects for housing, people leave the military after 
several years of commuting. Many military specialists are leaving the military after 
finding better conditions in the civilian labor market.   
D. MILITARY CONDITIONS  
Until now, the Czech Armed Forces used conscripts with compulsory military 
service as the main source for an enlisted force.  
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However, a large number of people prefer civilian alternative service or try to 
avoid service all together citing various reasons. In 1993, only 43% of those eligible 
conscripts served. This proportion has decreased every year. Also, there is a decreasing 
demographic trend.104 Compulsory military service is becoming more discriminating in 
nature. Some NATO countries still use conscription, but a process of gradual 
professionalization exists with the professional part on the increase. One of the reasons is 
that forces serve outside the NATO area, and the others are that young people are against 
conscription, and health conditions and demographic trends are worsening. The creation 
of semiprofessional or professional forces is a natural trend more than the will of 
legislators. An increasing number of European politicians realize this actuality and have 
begun to initiate discussions about fully professional forces and their future utility. The 
basic tasks of the Czech armed forces have changed, and the new tasks are so varied that 
it is not possible for them to be completed through compulsory military service. The 
length of such service is so short that it precludes sufficient training for the mastery of 
new weapon systems, and service outside the Czech territory.  
Compulsory service is an anachronism from the time when victory depended 
more on the number of soldiers than armaments. Also, the issues of human rights are 
connected with compulsory military service. Opponents of professional forces use 
arguments such as conscription is a citizen’s moral duty and that professionals are too 
expensive. However, this does not have to be the case, as shown in the examples of 
Britain, Belgium or the Netherlands. The main problem to be resolved in this process is a 
reduction of manpower in order to lessen the increase in personnel expenses. Past 
experience indicates it is possible to accomplish this without a reduction in fighting 
capability. The other important assumption is the motivation for voluntary enlistment. 
Since the unemployment rate is about 8%, it should be possible to recruit a sufficient 
number of young men and women if there is a good compensation package, available 
housing and decent career options. As in the Netherlands, it may be a combination of 
payment with education.  
                                                 
104 http://www.africa2000.com/RNDX/rfl-czech.html, Jeremy Bransten, Czech Republic: Drop In 
Birth Rates Spells Trouble (Part 2), RFE/RL, 10/19/01. 
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The new armed forces should consist of 38,000 to 40,000 men with about 5,000 
officers, 15,000 warrant officers and 20,000 enlisted personnel. This force is expected to 
be better equipped, trained, motivated, smaller, mobile, efficient and capable of fighting 
abroad. The Czech armed forces have undergone many changes in the last ten years, 
including a reduction in personnel.  
      




employees Sum total 
    1.1.1993           0        38 049      68 630          106 679      25 286          131 965 
    1.1.1994           0        33 282      54 326           87 608      23 634          111 242 
    1.1.1995           0        30 413      43 178           73 591      27 726          101 317 
    1.1.1996           0        27 654      36 797           64 451      26 456           90 907 
    1.1.1997           0        26 340      32 174           58 514      27 060           85 574 
    1.1.1998           0        23 759      32 942           56 701      21 797           78 498 
    1.1.1999           0        22 966      33 281           56 247      21 481           77 728 
    1.1.2000         976        23 721      31 185           54 906      21 301           76 207 
    1.1.2001       1 200        23 184      24 955           48 139      21 157           69 296 
 
Table 4.   Changes in the last 10 years. 
From: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p07.htm,
Real Personnel Strength Development in the Armed Forces,
Reform of the armed forces, Annexes.
 
Today, Czech officers serve at NATO headquarters and actively cooperate with 
other NATO countries. There is also bilateral relationship within NATO and the PfP. 
Frequent exercises with these countries outside the Czech Republic or exercises of these 
countries in the Czech Republic are the result of close cooperation. The Czech officers 
are studying languages as part of their careers, and the level of language readiness is 
increasing constantly.  
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There are many opportunities to study in military schools and academies in 
Europe, the United States or Canada. Also, NATO schools and courses are available to 
enhance the professional knowledge of Czech military personnel in all levels of 
command. In addition, the Czech military educational system underwent changes to 
better address new requirements for the armed forces. A new system of promotions 
similar to western European countries was created to provide a regular flow of personnel. 
Excess garrisons were dissolved to save scarce financial resources. The Czech Republic 
is also providing NATO with assigned forces. Of course, there are still many problems, 
which should be addressed during the transition to professional forces.  
The modernization of military equipment and weapon systems is the second part 
of reform, and will take place after the transformation of personnel. Civilian control of 
the armed forces was the main step in democratic changes of the military and has already 
been experienced for a decade. The acquisition process is going through radical reform 
after the acquisition department of the Ministry of Defense was dissolved this year on the 
Minister’s order. Due to an incorrectly signed contract on the L-159 “ALCA”, this 
program is absorbing a large part of the military budget. One of the questions now is if 
the new government from the 2002 elections will support reform as enacted or delay 
reform. The Czech military has experience from missions in SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR 
in Kosovo. An NBC company is deployed to Kuwait and there is a military field hospital 
in Afghanistan. The military is also going through a process of security clearances 
because many people worked for state security under the communist regime.105 Three 
years of NATO membership has caused the Czech armed forces to change, but even so, 








                                                 
105 http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=797344, Jan Gazdík, Tři roky v NATO: armáda má dvě 
tváře, Three years in NATO: armed forces has two faces, MF Dnes, 03/12/02, p 10. 
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VI. ANALYSIS, LESSONS LEARNED, RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will analyze the reasons for the creation of the all-volunteer force, 
the reduction in forces and transition period as well as the main problems encountered 
during the transition period.                
A. UK AND U.S. EXPERIENCE 
Professional forces have been adopted for many different reasons. Modern 
professional forces were first created in Great Britain mainly for economic reasons. 
During the Suez crisis, British forces encountered difficulties in providing sufficient 
logistic support to military operations. After this crisis, they looked for ways to save 
money. Great Britain had to fulfill its colonial as well as its NATO commitments. At that 
time, their large standing army of conscripts was very inefficient, and replacing the 
conscripts with fewer professionals was the correct answer. It eased the government’s 
budget and improved military capabilities. The idea behind forces without National 
Service was to rely more on nuclear deterrence and reduce the armed forces accordingly. 
The armed forces were to be reduced from 690,000 in 1957 to 375,000 professionals in 
1963. Larger strategic reserves were created to back up the smaller armed forces. 
The transformation process took seven years in Britain because of the economic 
situation. To create a professional force while reducing defense spending from more than 
7% to less than 6% of a country’s Gross National Product (GNP) meant more years of 
designing and restructuring.106 In practice, there were some problems and deficiencies in 
the creation of volunteer forces. Britain experienced recruitment problems from the 
beginning of reform. The reasons mentioned in Chapter IV were low birth rates, a 
demand for higher education, competition in the labor market and training opportunities 
in the civilian sector. The free market posed difficult problems when trying to attract the 
sufficient number of recruits. Owing to the government’s policy of full employment, the 
ability of the services to outbid civilian recruiters was highly limited and they 
increasingly relied on patriotism, excitement and adventure. In 1968, improvements in 
benefits and living conditions were announced.  
                                                 
106 Henry Stanhope, The Soldiers, (Hamish Hamilton Limited, London, 1979) p 20. 
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Until 1970, the relatively low wages were supplemented by free board and 
lodging. The concept of a military salary began in April 1970 with a salary comparable to 
the civilian sector.107 After 1975, income had fallen behind civilian income resulting in 
recruiting problems and low morale. Recruiting improved from May 1979 on when the 
new conservative government increased the pay rates.108 Ten years after the UK, the U.S. 
forces went through the same process, but for different reasons. There was very strong 
social pressure because of the Vietnam War. The inequality of the burden of conscription 
was undeniable, which was borne by minorities and poorer people. The challenge for the 
U.S. was that it did not substantially lower the number of troops. There were problems 
with recruiting, which opponents of volunteer forces criticized as inherent shortfalls. 
Nevertheless, the efficiency of the forces was improved. Quicker procurement of more 
sophisticated weapon systems in the arms race with the Soviets justified the creation of 
volunteer forces and higher levels of professional skills.  
Nixon endorsed the idea of an all-volunteer force in 1968 during his presidential 
campaign and he continued to advocate the idea.109 Soon after inauguration, he appointed 
a commission to study the concept, and in 1970 announced professionalization with a 
completion date of June 1973. In the U.S., the transformation of the armed forces to a 
fully professional force took three years, which was the fastest transformation with many 
more people that needed to be recruited than in other armed forces. The number of total 
personnel was reduced from about 2,900,000 in 1970 to about 2,200,000 at the beginning 
of 1974 with the replacement of conscripts. This was a real challenge. They had to 
respond to the Soviet threat and were the leading force in the NATO command, with 
forces and military establishments all over the world. In the U.S., there were some 
shortfalls in recruitment, especially in the Army, in the first years of the volunteer force. 
These shortfalls were allegedly due to the tightening of quality standards, a shortage of 
recruiters in the field and large recruiting quotas. Also, in the beginning, all-volunteer 
force recruiting was affected by low unemployment.  
                                                 
107 Henry Stanhope, The Soldiers, (Hamish Hamilton Limited, London, 1979) p. 36. 
108 Dan Smith, The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s, (Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1980), p. 147. 
109Donald Smith, The Volunteer Army, in Martin Anderson, The Military Draft, (Hoover Press, 1982), 
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Later, when unemployment increased, the problem with recruitment disappeared. 
Unemployment rates provided an opportunity to increase quality. “Civilianization” 
further reduced manpower costs by using civilian employees instead of military 
personnel. Also, reserve strength in the U.S. decreased from about 250,000 in 1970 to 
about 200,000 between 1973 and 1976. It was a reserve system created on the basis of 
non-prior-service (NPS) and prior service (PS) recruits where between fiscal years 1970 
and 1974, NPS enlistments decreased from about 180,000 to less than 50,000. Thus, the 
traditional mix of NPS and PS of 70/30 during the post-draft period switched to a 35/65 
mix with more reliance placed on PS personnel.110 The turnover of personnel was higher 
than during the draft, and one of the main tasks was to reduce the turnover rates.  
B. THE BELGIAN, FRENCH, SPANISH AND ITALIAN EXPERIENCES 
The Gulf War was the first major conflict for professional soldiers in coalition 
operations that stressed high mobility and quick deployment. As the Soviet threat 
disappeared, they enabled personnel (conscripts) to take part in economical and industrial 
processes. Soon after the Gulf War, another challenge for military organizations came 
with the Balkan conflict. In peacekeeping operations, professional forces again proved 
themselves in negotiations, enforcing civil order, and so forth.  
Belgium already felt the inefficiency of one-year conscription training. In 
Belgium, the Council of Ministers decided on March 29, 1993 to suspend conscription 
and the last conscripts entered service at the beginning of 1995. The plan was to decrease 
forces from 80,000 to 47,500 personnel (42,500 military and 5,000 civilian) by the end of 
2000. The process had to be executed with constant budgets and without dismissing any 
personnel against their will. The announced recruiting plan was not met, but it is 
anticipated that the goals will be reached at the end of 2002. The Belgium experience of a 
sudden loss of young people was due to an unfavorable budgetary situation and the policy 
to not dismiss any personnel against their will. The civilian population is losing interest 
in the armed forces. The military believes the unfavorable recruiting situation can be 
resolved by budget increases and attracting new recruits through better social conditions.  
                                                 
110 Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, (Rand Corporation, 1977) 
pp. 152,153. 
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A drastic plan for modernization towards smaller and mobile forces was created 
for 2000-2015. Although France started to create a fully professional force in 1996, the 
main reasons were recognized during the Gulf War. President Charles de Gaulle 
withdrew France from NATO military commands with the emphasis shifted to self-
sufficiency. Insufficiency forced them to use a lot of U.S. equipment. It was a hard lesson 
for France to learn. The military leadership started to work on new strategies and 
missions for post - Cold War French forces. In 1995, Chirac’s presidential campaign 
addressed the professional force issue based on proposals prepared by the military. A 
political decision with military support was made under these new conditions, in which 
large standing armies were no longer needed.  
In 1996, President Chirac announced his decision to end conscription by 2002, 
and cut the armed forces from half a million to 350,000.111 In France, the transformation 
was expected to be completed in seven years but was actually completed in six years 
through government decisions. France started in a manner similar to the U.S. France 
completed the process of transformation to an all-volunteer force in November 2001.112 
France ended conscription just last year and there was only one report available about a 
slight shortage in recruitment, but the reason is unclear. Spain, because of demographic 
trends and conscientious objection, decided to create fully professional forces at the same 
time as France. President Aznar announced his decision to professionalize the armed 
forces in 1996.113 Transformation ended at the end of 2001, with military personnel 
reduced from about 300,000 to between 170,000 and 150,000 in 2002.114 However, 
Spain, unlike France, had problems with recruiting and is still looking for more people. 
The strength of the armed forces fell to 74,500 compared to the target figure of 80,000 for 
the end of 2001.115  
                                                 
111 http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/french-reform.cfm, France: Preparing for New Types of Warfare in a 
New Century, Center for Defense Information, 03/13/02. 
112 Jac Lewis, France Completes Move to All-Regular Forces, Jane's Defence Weekly, 12/12/01. 
113 http://www.ehis.navy.mil/tp/humanscience/pdf/michavila.pdf, Captain Dtor Narciso Michavila, 
The Professional Soldier in Spain.  
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Spain is facing a lack of volunteer manpower and early on has communicated 
with Spanish speaking countries in South America about the possibility of recruitment. 
The main reasons are that military pay is much below the civilian sector, economic 
prosperity and highly unfavorable demographic trends. They tried to face the shortage of 
recruits in several ways. Besides attracting immigrants, the armed forces raised the age of 
recruits and lowered intelligence standards. In Italy, the process of transformation started 
in 1999 with proposed legislation to abandon conscription. Congress passed the law in 
late 2000. Regular soldiers will increase to 42,000 men, while conscription will be phased 
out and the service will be opened to women. The overall forces will be reduced from 
about 270,000 to 190,000 in 2006.116 Reform of the Italian forces is expected to take six 
years with personnel cut by 30%.  To fill the gap in recruitment, Italy is considering 
recruiting foreign nationals.  
C. THE CZECH REPUBLIC CIRCUMSTANCES 
The Czech Republic was interested in professional forces for military reasons 
when it started to structure its forces for NATO membership. Attention was not paid to 
the armed forces until the announcement of accession talks to NATO. However, after 
assessing the necessary minimum in political spheres, this topic was also once again 
neglected. The leading party usually occupied ministries such as finance, foreign affairs, 
and the interior with defense being lower in priority than economic affairs. New ministers 
were not in office long enough to affect real changes. None of the ministers was able to 
present meaningful concepts and perspectives to create an efficient working mechanism. 
Ineffective and slow downsizing cost the armed forces many good professionals and 
specialists. The old way of thinking and doing business made decision-making slower 
than expected by NATO allies. After joining NATO, more pressure was applied on 
commands to meet the new standards. Due to the inefficient system at the Czech MOD, 
conditions became more stressful and difficult. For example, there was still a significant 
amount of fraud in purchasing and acquisition. The purchase of the L-159 ALCA cost the 
armed forces about 70% of their budget. Ministers were criticized, but there was no 
radical change in the administration.  
                                                 
116 http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,398085,00.html, Rory Carroll, 
Guardian Unlimited, October 25, 2000. 
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In April 2001, after heavy criticism of the Ministry of Defense, Minister Vetchý 
was withdrawn and replaced by his economic assistant Jaroslav Tvrdík.117 It was on the 
basis of bad management of resort, which started to use strategic reserves in the case of 
an emergency. The new minister’s first task, among others, was to prepare for the 
transition to fully professional forces.118 From his first day in office, there was doubt 
about those radical changes. The minister is using his years of experience in the armed 
forces to carry out difficult reforms. The main reason for reform in the Czech Republic is 
political in the context of economic problems and NATO commitments. The Czech 
Republic would like to carry out reform in six years. However, some doubts have already 
been raised. The new government can postpone reform by proceeding slowly, and 
hesitating, or by requiring additional documents. There is also the fear that the needed 
legislation will not be passed for recruiting new personnel.  
A system of 13 recruitment centers is already prepared and has conducted 
experimental operations. Recruitment centers are supported by a center for personal 
marketing119, which is included in a centralized system of recruitment and selection. This 
system should analyze the labor market and help in competing with the civilian sector for 
recruits. Training and education is an essential part of the preparation of professional 
soldiers and should be connected with a career and promotion system. The education 
system is now being developed to consist of one military high school and one military 
university. The training system was designed in cooperation with the Training and 
Doctrine Command of the U.S. Army, Fort Monroe, Virginia. The pay system is geared 
towards attracting recruits and should be generally comparable to civilian equivalents. 
However, in times of low unemployment, competition becomes more difficult. 
Government support is now available to provide support with the correct legislation to 
enable a smooth transition. Not preparing for these conditions can threaten the defense 
capabilities of the country and weaken collective defense arrangements.  
                                                 
117 http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=441936, Jan Gazdik, Ministrem je Tvrdík, Tvrdík is the 
Minister, MF Dnes, 05/04/01, p. 1. 
118 http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=90755, Jan Gazdík, Armáda je dál než úředníci, říká 
Tvrdík, Armed Forces are further than ministerial clerks, explains Tvrdík, MF Dnes, 05/05/01, p. 3. 
119 http://www.ehis.navy.mil/tp/humanscience/pdf/soumar.pdf - Libor Soumar, Czech Armed Forces 
are Preparing New Selection System. 
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It would undermine our position in NATO. A career system was created for 
promotions and to replace personnel. It should work similar to the U.S. system of “up or 
out”. Also, the system allows full retirement after 20 years of service. A new and 
restructured reserve system should be able to provide sufficient manpower in the case of 
an emergency. The structure of the reserves appears in the following figure.  
 
Figure 3.   Structure of the Reserves.   
From: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p14.htm, Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 
Annexes, Forming and Structure of the Reserves. 
 
The Czech Republic prepared the documents for transition to the government 
based on the experience of professionalization in Belgium and the Netherlands. Also, 
there was some exchange of information with the CUBIC, a U.S. corporation, which 
specializes in reforms to fully professional forces. After the approval of the new 










Figure 4.   Structure of the Future Force. 
Resource: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p14.htm, Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 
Annexes, AFCR Structure. 
 
The reform of the Armed Forces is based on the military and political ambitions 
of the Czech Republic. See the next figure. 
• Full-strength participation in Article 5 common defense operation 
• Participation in a single peace-enforcing operation with a brigade-size 
contingent (up to 5,000-strong) of ground forces or an equivalent-size 
contingent of the air force (starting in 2007) for a period not exceeding six 
months (without rotation), while maintaining the capability of receiving 
forces of the Alliance in its own territory and ensuring an active 
participation of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in the 
NATINEADS system, or 
• Long-term participation in a single peace-supporting or -keeping operation 
with a battalion-size contingent of ground forces or an equivalent-size 
contingent of the air force, plus the possibility of short-term participation 
in another subsequent and parallel operation (humanitarian assistance, 
disaster relief etc.) with a contingent up to 250 people for a period not 
exceeding six months (without rotation), while maintaining the capability 
of receiving forces of the Alliance in its own territory and ensuring an 
active participation of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in the 
NATINEADS system, and, at the same time, 
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• Retain the capability of fulfilling tasks in the territory of the Czech 
Republic arising from national laws together and in parallel with each of 





Figure 5.   Military Reform. 
Resource: http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p14.htm, Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, Annexes 
Politico-Military Ambitions of the Czech Republic. 
  
D. LESSONS LEARNED 
In general, the reasons for the creation of professional forces vary, and usually are 
affected by the geopolitical situation. Spain was affected also by the increasing number of 
conscientious objectors. In both France and Spain, the decision to transform the military 
to a professional force was supported by the public even though the tradition of 
conscription has existed for a long time. In Italy, there was a political reason for the 
change, probably affected by changes around Europe. Generally, the transition process 
takes about six years and usually conscription is phased out sequentially. Also, it is 
possible to transition to professional forces, which are about half the size of the conscript 
force.  
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Of course, it has to be able to fulfill the new strategy and tasks of countries and it 
is possible with the sufficient support of reserve forces. As seen from the experiences of 
different countries, the length differs and is slightly affected by economic conditions such 
as the civilian labor market along with wage levels, and the unemployment rate. All this 
needs to be reflected in the enlistment package. The Czech Republic is just beginning this 
complex process but this process has been proven with the experience of the volunteer 
forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands in 
addition to the new cases of France and Spain. The problems experienced showed this to 
not be an easy process. It requires the support of the government and the involvement of 
society as a whole.  
Many management changes are needed to create efficient and balanced 
professional forces. A need for new recruitment, education, training, payment, retirement, 
promotion and reserve forces systems exists. These are the vital parts of well functioning 
professional forces. Only under these conditions can society create a force controlled by 
civilians and be able to fulfill its tasks in a professional manner. Recruitment retraining 
and attracting new personnel in sufficient numbers is the main task of professional forces. 
It will require creating favorable conditions especially for the enlistees and non-
commissioned officers who will replace the conscripts. An efficient selection system 
should be developed to obtain not only the correct number of recruits but also quality 
recruits. In light of historical experience and today’s conditions, it should be possible to 
transition Czech armed forces if there is political willingness to implement reform by 
supporting and funding the transition plan. As seen from the experience of different 
countries, the length differs and is slightly affected by economic conditions, which have 
to include the civilian labor market along with its wage levels, and the unemployment 








The world is experiencing great changes with unpredictable results. Twenty years 
ago nobody would have expected that the superpower rivals the United States and the 
Soviet Union to cooperate and share military information, or that Eastern bloc countries 
would exercise with and share the collective defense of their countries with Western 
Europe countries and NATO. All this is now happening and began with the intent to halt 
the arms race and to demonstrate the desire to cooperate. The communist regime had 
collapsed and its successors must start from scratch to attempt to approach the conditions 
and life style of the Western countries. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet 
Union, brand new countries are looking for new identities. One of them is the Czech 
Republic, which in 1989 was a part of the Czechoslovak state that overthrew the 
communist government in the so-called “Velvet Revolution”. Defense institutions in 
Europe, the United States and Canada were downsizing. The disappearance of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact also resulted in severe downsizing in Eastern European 
countries.  
Countries with conscripts began to shorten the length of service due to public 
pressure. The main reason was to help weakened economies. In 1990, the world 
community had to conduct common operations during the Gulf War. Cooperation and 
common strategy and tactics were essential to achieve operational goals. For the first 
time, some countries had a chance to cooperate with NATO forces. Also, France 
recognized the fundamental deficiencies in this type of mission. It was difficult for 
France to send the assigned number of people. Great Britain was able to send twice as 
many troops. The second problem was the lack of equipment used in this type of conflict. 
French self-esteem, a result of the Gaullist self-sufficiency policy, suffered. A Czech 
NBC Company, with a strength of 170 men, was able for the first time to work in a joint 
environment in Kuwait, and their participation resulted in positive outcomes. The Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republics were only an interim state, and could not prevent the 
growing disagreement between the strongest parties after the 1992 elections.  
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Another event was the crisis in Yugoslavia. In February 1992, the UNPROFOR 
force was established. The UN worked in cooperation with NATO forces. The Czech 
Republic was one of the countries involved. After the so-called “Velvet Divorce” two 
new independent states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, emerged after 1 January 1993. 
The Czech Republic sought a stable, democratic type of government to ensure stability 
and prosperity. President Václav Havel started to develop good relations with 
neighboring countries and to incorporate the Czech Republic into the European 
community. One of the main concerns was security and defense. The armed forces were 
reduced to save some money. The main focus was on economic reforms and 
privatization. Slow changes in the military with no clear direction led to a loss of 
specialists, managers and leaders. The military had obsolete weapons, out-of-date 
manuals and budget restrictions. One positive change was the creation of a civilian 
control system.  The lack of public interest made it possible for people from other parties 
to attain the post of Defense Minister due to the lack of attention from the strongest party. 
In 1993, a concept for the development of the armed forces of the Czech Republic, to be 
implemented by 1996, was drafted, but due to budget restrictions, implementation has 
been delayed. 
In Belgium, the decision was made to create professional forces in 1993, in order 
to better fulfill new types of missions. Countries with a history of all-volunteer forces, 
such as the United States and Great Britain, were very efficient and were able to send 
forces anywhere very quickly. In 1994, the Czech Republic started to actively work in the 
new framework of the Partnership for Peace. It was important to create a European 
security environment. In December 1995, the Czech Armed Forces were participating in 
Bosnia as a part of the multinational NATO-led peace force IFOR. The Netherlands 
abandoned conscription in 1996. At the same time, France announced the transformation 
to an all-volunteer force by 2002. The new trend was followed by Spain in the same year. 
The Czech public started to renew its interested in armed forces after an invitation to 
talks about NATO accession in 1997. NATO assigned tasks to the Czech Republic and 
other potential new members requiring NATO language training and NATO military 
procedures.  
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Also, everybody had to undergo a security clearance process, which was supposed 
to eliminate people who had worked for the state police. NATO standards were adopted 
and a new process of restructuring started. The main emphasis was on NATO - assigned 
forces. On Wednesday, 24 March 1999, NATO began air strikes against Serbian military 
targets in Yugoslavia in response to Serb actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 
This conflict amply proved the need for small, well-trained, well-equipped, and quickly 
deployable forces. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were all accepted as 
new NATO member states. There were still some problems and double standards were 
created in the armed forces. On the one hand, soldiers in NATO missions had the best 
equipment, but sometimes forces at home lacked equipment. People in missions abroad 
were highly valued and appreciated, while forces at home endured average and worse 
conditions. Also, Czech officers started to serve at NATO headquarters. Problems in 
planning, acquisition and obsolete equipment not compatible with NATO negatively 
affected progress. In addition, conscription was increasingly a problem. Demographic 
trends are unfavorable, and there is less interest in military service. Young people are 
choosing alternative civilian service. The Prime Minister had to withdraw the Minister of 
Defense and replace him with his economic deputy. His task is to create professional 
forces.  
The new Minister started radical changes and a Center for Reform was created 
and tasked with creating a transformation plan. The study for the transition of forces is 
prepared and reorganization is already proceeding in education and training systems. A 
new recruitment system is currently being tested. These are the circumstance now facing 
the Czech Republic, which is now at a point where a new government can decide further 
steps for reform. Who will win the elections is not clear, and there are fears that the new 
government can delay the whole process through budget cuts, or not passing the 
necessary legislation supporting the new military system. The new European trend is 
clear. What is the experience of countries already using an all-volunteer system? The 
oldest volunteer system is in Britain and this system is working well but there were some 
problems when reform began. They had problems with recruiting and they had to adjust 
salaries to retain a sufficient number of people. In the United States, they had problems 
attracting non-prior-service recruits to the reserves.  
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Spain is experiencing recruitment problems. One problem is insufficient salaries 
in comparison with the civilian labor market. Spain is looking into other possibilities, 
such as recruiting immigrants because of the very low birth rate. In Belgium, there are 
budgetary problems, and financial incentives are not attracting new recruits. Belgium will 
go through a further reduction of forces. Enough information exists on what needs to be 
done, but budgetary constraints may preclude attracting enough recruits. Why is 
conscription not an effective system under these new conditions? There are many 
problems with conscription. First, it is perceived to be discriminatory in nature and many 
young people are opposed to serving. They feel that it is not a free choice. Due to this 
discriminating disposition, conscripts are not able perform their best, and they do not why 
they should have to. When alternative civilian service began, it was possible to choose, 
but young people prefer alternative to compulsory service. The main reason is the 
service’s new character, which should handle disasters, terrorist actions and emergencies. 
Another problem is the short length of service does not provide enough time to undergo 
training and then apply the training. Usually they leave the service soon after they are 
trained.  
The main deficiency of conscripts in the new military environment is that they are 
not deployable abroad. From an economic point of view, conscription is a burden for a 
country because recruits could be more beneficial to the economy in the civilian labor 
market. None of the countries entirely abandoned conscription. Usually there are clauses 
in the constitutions that permit conscription in the case of need. The biggest advantage of 
an all-volunteer force is highly skilled professional soldiers ready for deployment 
anywhere in the world. It is cheaper than conscription in terms of training since the 
service period is longer and therefore money spent on training is better utilized. The 
professional soldier can be used outside the area of the operation, while the main task of 
conscripts is national defense inside national borders. Professional forces are more 
motivated. These conditions make the professional soldier the most effective alternative 
for future warfare. Are the Czech Republic and its armed forces ready for the transition to 
professional forces? There were signals from politicians that they understand the need 
and would support professional armed forces. However, these conditions can change after 
upcoming elections.  
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Economically, conditions can be favorable if the budget for armed forces is 
preserved at 2.2% of the GDP and 8% unemployment continues. Social conditions are 
favorable and people in general are supporting changes to the military system. Still, there 
are problems, which should be addressed by legislation, especially in housing. The 
military had studied transformation, and has studied and consulted with foreign military 
experts. After the first stage of reform, a second stage should be focused on the 
modernization of equipment. The Czech armed forces and military officials announced 
that they are ready to start reform. From historical perspectives, there are inevitable 
questions. Will NATO disappear or will there be one force for all of Europe? We can 
speculate but we cannot answer these questions. However, it is certain that the Czech 
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